Stochastic games on a product state space by Flesch, J. et al.
  
 
Stochastic games on a product state space
Citation for published version (APA):
Flesch, J., Schoenmakers, G. M., & Vrieze, K. (2007). Stochastic games on a product state space.
(METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 010). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of
Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2007
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
János Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers, Koos Vrieze 
 
Stochastic Games on a Product State Space 
 
RM/07/010 
 
 
JEL code: C73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht research school of Economics 
of TEchnology and ORganizations 
 
Universiteit Maastricht 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
P.O. Box 616 
NL - 6200 MD Maastricht 
 
phone : ++31 43 388 3830 
fax : ++31 43 388 4873 
 
 
 
 
 
Stochastic Games on a Product State Space
Ja´nos Flesch∗, Gijs Schoenmakers, Koos Vrieze†
March 27, 2007
Abstract
We examine product-games, which are n-player stochastic games satisfying: (1)
the state space is a product S1×· · ·×Sn; (2) the action space of any player i only
depends of the i-th coordinate of the state; (3) the transition probability of moving
from si ∈ Si to ti ∈ Si, on the i-th coordinate Si of the state space, only depends
on the action chosen by player i. So, as far as the actions and the transitions
are concerned, every player i can play on the i-th coordinate of the product-game
without interference of the other players. No condition is imposed on the payoff
structure of the game.
We focus on product-games with an aperiodic transition structure, for which we
present an approach based on so-called communicating states. For the general n-
player case, we establish the existence of 0-equilibria, which makes product-games
one of the first classes within n-player stochastic games with such a result. In ad-
dition, for the special case of two-player zero-sum games of this type, we show that
both players have stationary 0-optimal strategies. Both proofs are constructive by
nature.
Keywords: Noncooperative Games, Stochastic Games, Markov De-
cision Problems, equilibria.
1 Introduction
Stochastic games and product-games. An n-player stochastic game is given by
(1) a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, (2) a nonempty and finite set of states S, (3) for
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matics, P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
1
each state s ∈ S, a nonempty and finite set of actions Ais for each player i, (4) for each
state s ∈ S and each joint action as ∈ ×i∈NA
i
s, a payoff r
i
s(as) ∈ R to each player i,
(5) for each state s ∈ S and each joint action as ∈ ×i∈NA
i
s, a transition probability
distribution psas = (psas(t))t∈S .
The game is to be played at stages in N in the following way. Play starts at stage 1
in an initial state, say in state s1 ∈ S. In s1, each player i ∈ N is to choose an action
ai1 from his action set A
i
s1
. These choices have to be made independently. The chosen
joint action a1 = (a
1
1, . . . , a
n
1 ) induces an immediate payoff r
i
s1
(a1) to each player i.
Next, play moves to a new state according to the transition probability distribution
ps1a1 , say to state s2 ∈ S. At stage 2, a new action a
i
2 ∈ A
i
s2
is to be chosen by
each player i in state s2. Then, given action combination a2 = (a
1
2, . . . , a
n
2 ), player i
receives payoff ris2(a2) and the play moves to some state s3 according to the transition
probability distribution ps2a2 , and so on. We assume complete information (i.e. the
players know all the data of the stochastic game), full monitoring (i.e. the players
observe the present state and the actions chosen by all the players), and perfect recall
(i.e. the players remember all previous states and actions).
A Markov transition structure Γi for player i ∈ N is given by (1) a nonempty and
finite state space Si; (2) a nonempty and finite action set Ai
si
for each state si ∈ Si; (3)
a transition probability distribution pi
siai
si
over the state space Si for each state si ∈ Si
and for each action ai
si
∈ Ai
si
. Note that, if we also assigned a payoff in every state to
every action, then we would obtain the well-known model of Markov decision problems
for player i.
We will now consider a special type of n-player stochastic games in which the
transition structure is derived by taking the product of these n Markov transition
structures. For the sake of simplicity, we will call such a game a product-game. A
product-game G, associated to the Markov transition structures Γ1, Γ2, . . . ,Γn, is an
n-player stochastic game for which (1) the set of players is N = {1, . . . , n} ; (2) the
state space is S = S1 × · · · × Sn; (3) the action set for each player i ∈ N in each state
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is Ais = A
i
si
; (4) the transition probability distribution psas , for
each state s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S and for each joint action as = (a
1
s, . . . , a
n
s ) ∈ ×i∈NA
i
s, is
psas (s¯) =
∏
i∈N
pisiais
(s¯i)
for state s¯ = (s¯1, . . . , s¯n) ∈ S. Note that there is no condition imposed on the payoff
structure.
Observe that (1) the action space of player i only depends on the i-th coordinate
2
of the state, (2) the i-th coordinate of the transitions from any state s only depend on
the i-th coordinate si of the state and on the action ais chosen by player i, i.e. for any
s¯i ∈ Si we have
psas(S
1, . . . , Si−1, s¯i, Si+1, . . . , Sn) = pisiais
(s¯i).
Therefore, as far as the actions and the transitions are concerned, player i can play
on the i-th coordinate of the game G without the interference of the other players.
As a consequence, play of the product game G can be viewed as simultaneous play
of the n Markov transition structures Γ1, . . . ,Γn, which are linked by payoff functions
r1, . . . , rn that may depend on all n current states as well as on all n actions chosen by
the players.
Product-games have been introduced in Altman et al. [2005], although in a some-
what different fashion. They only examined two-player games in which the sum of the
payoffs is always equal to zero (zero-sum games), and dropped the assumption of full
monitoring by letting each player only observe his own coordinate of the present state
and only the action chosen by himself. As a result, both players have to make choices
without noticing anything about the other player’s behavior. They showed that a linear
programming formulation is sufficient to solve these games, i.e. to find the value and
stationary optimal strategies (cf. the definitions below).
Note that the class of product-games, as defined in our paper, differs essentially
from other known classes of n-player stochastic games. Stochastic games with a single
controller, i.e. when one player controls the transitions, however, fall into the class
of product-games. Indeed, a stochastic game which is controlled by player i can be
seen as a product-game in which Sj is a singleton for all players j 6= i. Finally, we
wish to mention the class of stochastic games with additive transitions (AT-games, cf.
Flesch et al. [2007]), i.e. when the transitions are additively decomposable into player-
dependent components, in contrast with a product decomposition. Not surprisingly,
the structure of product-games and AT-games differ essentially, and product-games
require new ideas and an entirely different approach.
From now on, we will consequently use the upper-index for the player and the lower-
index for the state. Whenever one of them is omitted, we will then mean a vector in
the case of quantities and a product in the case of sets, for all possible players or states
respectively. For example, Ai denotes ×s∈SA
i
s. Finally, we denote the set of opponents
of any player i by −i := N − {i}. Then, −i in the upper-index will mean a vector or
product for all players j 6= i. For example, S−i denotes ×j∈N−{i}S
j .
Strategies. A mixed action xis for player i in state s ∈ S is a probability distribu-
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tion on Ais. The set of mixed actions for player i in state s is denoted by X
i
s. A mixed
action is called completely mixed, if it assigns a positive probability to each available
action. A (history dependent) strategy pii for player i is a decision rule that prescribes a
mixed action piis(h) ∈ X
i
s in the present state s depending on the past history h of play
(i.e. the sequence of all past states and all past actions chosen by the players). We use
the notation Πi for the set of strategies for player i. A strategy pii for player i is called
pure if pii prescribes, for every state and every possible history, one specific action to be
played with probability 1. Given a strategy pii for player i and a history h, the strategy
pii conditional on h, denoted by pii[h], is the strategy which prescribes a mixed action
piis[h](h
′) in any present state s for any history h′ as if h had happened before h′, i.e.
piis[h](h
′) = piis(h ⊕ h
′), where h ⊕ h′ is the history consisting of h concatenated by h′.
In fact, pii[h] is just the continuation strategy of pii after history h.
If the mixed actions prescribed by a strategy only depend on the present state then
the strategy is called stationary. Thus, the stationary strategy space for player i is
Xi = ×s∈S X
i
s. We use the notation x
i for stationary strategies for player i, while xis
refers to the corresponding mixed action for player i in state s. Note that the set of
pure stationary strategies for player i is simply Ai = ×s∈SA
i
s.
A joint stationary strategy x = (xi)i∈N induces a Markov-chain on the state space S
with transition matrix P (x), where entry (s, s¯) of P (x) gives the transition probability
psxs(s¯) for moving from state s to state s¯ when the joint mixed action xs is played in
state s. With respect to this Markov-chain, we can speak of transient and recurrent
states. A state is called recurrent if, when starting there, play will eventually return
with probability 1; otherwise the state is called transient. If play is in a recurrent state,
then this state will be visited infinitely often with probability 1, while transient states
can only be visited finitely many times, with probability 1. We can group the recurrent
states into minimal closed sets, into so-called ergodic sets. An ergodic set is a collection
F of recurrent states with the property that, when starting in any of the states in F ,
all states in F will be visited infinitely often and the play will remain in F forever with
probability 1.
Let
Q(x) := lim
M→∞
1
M
M∑
m=1
Pm(x); (1)
the limit is known to exist (cf. Doob [1953], theorem 2.1, page 175). Entry (s, s¯) of
the stochastic matrix Q(x), denoted by qsx(s¯), is the expected frequency of stages for
which the process is in state s¯ when starting in s. The matrix Q(x) has the well known
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properties (cf. Doob [1953]) that
Q(x) = Q(x)P (x) = P (x)Q(x) = Q2(x). (2)
Note that Q(·) is in general not continuous on the set X of joint stationary strategies.
Indeed, if xm converges to x but the probabilities on certain actions vanish in the limit,
then the ergodic structure of the induced Markov chains may change drastically in the
limit.
Rewards. For a joint strategy pi = (pii)i∈N and initial state s ∈ S, the sequences
of payoffs are evaluated by the (expected) average reward, which is given for player i
by
γis(pi) := lim inf
M→∞
Espi
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Rim
)
= lim inf
M→∞
1
M
M∑
m=1
Espi
(
Rim
)
,
where Rim is the random variable for the payoff for player i at stage m, and where Espi
stands for expectation with respect to the initial state s and the joint strategy pi.
With regard to a joint stationary strategy x = (xi)i∈N , we obtain more explicit
formulas for the average reward. Let ris (xs) denote the expected immediate payoff for
player i in state s if the joint mixed action xs is played. By definition, for the average
reward of every player i we have
γi(x) = Q(x) ri(x), (3)
hence by (2) we also obtain
γi(x) = P (x) γi(x) (4)
γi(x) = Q(x) ri(x) = Q2(x) ri(x) = Q(x) γi(x). (5)
Note that, as Q(·) is not necessarily continuous on the set X of joint stationary
strategies, the same holds for the average reward γi of any player i. This possible
discontinuity causes the main difficulties in the analysis of stochastic games with the
average reward.
Nevertheless, every player i has a stationary best reply against any fixed joint
stationary strategy of his opponents (cf. Hordijk et al. [1983]), i.e. for any x−i ∈ X−i
there exists an xi ∈ Xi such that γis(x
i, x−i) ≥ γis(pi
i, x−i) for all initial states s ∈ S
and for all strategies pii ∈ Πi.
For any player i ∈ N and initial state s ∈ S, let
vis := inf
pi−i∈Π−i
sup
pii∈Πi
γis(pi
i, pi−i). (6)
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Here vis is called the minmax-level for player i in state s. Intuitively, this is the highest
reward that player i can defend against any strategies of the other players if the initial
state is s. Note that, against different joint strategies of players −i, player i may have
to use different strategies to defend his minmax-level (as changing the order of infimum
and supremum may yield a lower reward). It is known that the minmax-level of any
player i satisfies
vis = min
x−is ∈X
−i
s
max
xis∈X
i
s
∑
t∈S
p
s,(xis,x
−i
s )
(t) vit, (7)
which is an easy consequence of the definition of vis and equality (4). Furthermore,
by Thuijsman & Vrieze [1991] (their proof is given for only two players but directly
extends to the n-player case), there always exists an initial state s in the set {t ∈
S| vit = mint′∈S v
i
t′} for which players −i have a joint stationary strategy x
−i such
that γis(pi
i, x−i) ≤ vis for all strategies pi
i for player i. In other words, the infimum in
expression (6) is attained for state s at stationary strategies.
Equilibria. A joint strategy pi = (pii)i∈N is called a (Nash) ε-equilibrium for initial
state s ∈ S, for some ε ≥ 0, if
γis
(
σi, pi−i
)
≤ γis (pi) + ε ∀σ
i ∈ Πi, ∀i ∈ N,
which means that no player can gain more than ε by a unilateral deviation. Equiva-
lently, for each player i, strategy pii is an ε-best reply for initial state s against pi−i. If pi
is an ε-equilibrium for all initial states, then we call pi an ε-equilibrium. It is clear from
the definition of the minmax-level v that if pi is an ε-equilibrium then γis(pi) ≥ v
i
s − ε
for each player i and each initial state s ∈ S.
Regarding general stochastic games, the famous game called the Big Match, which
was introduced by Gillette [1957] and solved by Blackwell & Ferguson [1968], and
the game in Sorin [1986] demonstrated that 0-equilibria do not necessarily exist with
respect to the average reward. They made it clear, moreover, that history dependent
strategies are indispensable for establishing ε-equilibria, for ε > 0.
For two-player stochastic games, Vieille [2000-a,b] managed to establish the ex-
istence of ε-equilibria, for all ε > 0. However, only little is known about n-player
stochastic games, and it is unresolved whether they always possess ε-equilibria, for all
ε > 0. This is probably the most challenging open problem in the field of stochastic
games these days.
For the class of n-player aperiodic product-games, we will answer this question
in the affirmative by proving the existence of 0-equilibria (cf. Main Theorem 1).
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Here aperiodicity refers to an aperiodic transition structure, and will be given a pre-
cise definition later. Our proof is constructive by nature. The approach we present
relies on so-called communicating states. The notion of communicating states we use
is borrowed from the literature of Markov decision problems. We call two states of
the game communicating if from either state, the players can move to the other state
in finite time with probability 1 by choosing appropriate joint actions. We could call
these states weakly communicating in order to emphasise that all players are needed
to move between the states. The applicability of this form of weak communication is
limited for general stochastic games for the simple reason that there is in general no
guarantee that it is in all players’ interest to follow the path between such communicat-
ing states. Nevertheless, for the class of product-games, due to their specific transition
structure, this weak communication plays a fundamental role in the analysis, as we will
demonstrate below.
Zero-sum games and optimality. In the development of stochastic games, a
special role has been played by the class of zero-sum stochastic games, which are two-
player stochastic games for which r2s(as) = −r
1
s(as) (meaning that the sum of the
payoffs is zero), for each state s and for each joint action as. In these games the two
players have completely opposite interests. Mertens & Neyman [1981] showed that for
such games v2 = −v1. Here v := v1 is called the value of the game. They also showed
that, if instead of using liminf one uses limsup in the definition of the average reward,
one would find precisely the same value v. Thus, in a zero-sum game, player 1 wants
to maximize his own reward, while at the same time player 2 tries to minimize player
1’s reward. For simplicity, let γ = γ1. A strategy pi1 for player 1 is called ε-optimal
for initial state s ∈ S, for some ε ≥ 0, if γs(pi
1, pi2) ≥ vs − ε for any strategy pi
2 of
player 2, while a strategy pi2 for player 2 is called ε-optimal for initial state s ∈ S if
γs(pi
1, pi2) ≤ vs + ε for any strategy pi
1 of player 1. If pi1 or pi2 is ε-optimal for all initial
states, then we call pi1 or pi2 an ε-optimal strategy. For simplicity, 0-optimal strategies
are briefly called optimal. Mertens and Neyman [1981] proved that both players have ε-
optimal strategies for any ε > 0, even though history dependent strategies are necessary
for ε-optimality.
For the class of aperiodic zero-sum product-games, we will provide a proof that both
players have stationary 0-optimal strategies (cf. Main Theorem 2). In addition, we
analyse the structure of the value of these games.
The structure of the article. In section 2, we will present the main results and
a detailed outline of the proofs, together with illustrative examples. The formal proofs
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are given in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes with a short discussion on the case
of periodic product-games.
2 The main results and a detailed outline of the proofs
2.1 The main results
For the class of product-games, we present the following result concerning existence of
equilibria.
Main Theorem 1. There exists a 0-equilibrium in every aperiodic n-player product-
game.
Aperiodicity refers to an aperiodic transition structure, and we will give a pre-
cise definition in section 2.2. In addition, for the special case of two-player zero-sum
product-games, we show the existence of stationary solutions.
Main Theorem 2. In two-player aperiodic zero-sum product-games, both players have
a stationary 0-optimal strategy.
As Main Theorem 2 will follow without much difficulty (cf. the end of section 3.1.3)
from our extensive study of the minmax-levels in general n-player product-games, we
will focus here on the proof of Main Theorem 1.
Now we provide a detailed outline of the proof of Main Theorem 1; the formal proof
is given in section 3. The proof of Main Theorem 1 is constructive by nature. After
some preliminary concepts and results in section 2.2, the first main step is to analyse
the minmax-levels of the players in depth in section 2.3. Given the structural properties
we achieve, we finally discuss the construction of 0-equilibria in section 2.4.
2.2 Preliminary concepts and results
Some of the contents of this section is very similar to the decomposition presented in
Ross and Varadarajan [1991] for Markov decision problems (i.e. stochastic games with
only one player).
Classification of states. First, we analyse the Markov transition structure Γi
of each player i separately. We distinguish between two basic types of states in the
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state space Si of Γi, based on the possibilities that player i has at his disposal to move
between states.
A state si ∈ Si belongs to type 1 if it has the properties that (1) regardless the
action of player i in state si, play leaves si with a positive probability, and (2) after
leaving si through any action, the probability that player i ever comes back to si is
strictly less than 1, regardless his strategy. Let S⋄i denote the set of states of type 1
for player i. Hence, player i can only be in S⋄i at finitely many stages, with probability
1.
On the other hand, a state si ∈ Si belongs to type 2 if it has the property that
either (1) player i has an action in state si which keeps play in si with probability 1,
or (2) player i has an action in state si such that, given play leaves si through this
action, player i is able to come back to state si, possibly in a number of moves, with
probability 1. Hence, given player i is in a state of type 2, player i can visit this state
infinitely often, if he wishes so.
It is clear that each state in Si belongs to precisely one type, and that there is
always at least one state belonging to type 2.
Maximal communicating sets. Two states si1 and s
i
2 of type 2 are said to
communicate with each other, if, starting in state si1, player i is able to go to state s
i
2
with probability 1, possibly in a number of moves, and vice versa. This relationship of
communication is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric and transitive) on the
set of states of type 2. As such, it induces equivalence classes, which we call maximal
communicating sets. So, by definition, two states of type 2 belong to the same maximal
communicating set if and only if they communicate with each other.
Therefore, every maximal communicating set Ei has the properties that (1) player
i can go from any state in Ei to any other state in Ei, possibly in a number of moves,
without leaving Ei with probability 1 and (2) if player i decides to leave Ei, the
probability that he ever comes back to Ei is strictly less than 1, regardless his strategy.
The latter observation further implies that (3) the total number of times during the
whole play that player i switches from a maximal communicating set to another one is
finite with probability 1, regardless the initial state and player i’s strategy; (4) there is
always at least one amongst the maximal communicating sets which player i is unable to
leave, i.e. there are no transitions to states outside; (5) regardless the initial state and
player i’s strategy, player i eventually settles, with probability 1, in one of his maximal
communicating sets Ei, i.e. after finitely many stages, player i remains forever in Ei
(it is possible that player i would be able to leave Ei with a different strategy).
Let Ei
ki
, where ki ∈ Ki, denote the maximal communicating sets for player i.
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Within the index-set Ki, we distinguish K∗i ⊂ Ki for those maximal communicating
sets which player i is not able to leave. In view of observation (4), K∗i is always
nonempty. Further, let K := ×ni=1K
i. For any k = (k1, . . . , kn) ∈ K, the product
Ek := ×
n
i=1E
i
ki
of the maximal communicating sets Ei
ki
, with i = 1, . . . , n, is called a
joint maximal communicating set.
In every state si of the communicating set Ei
ki
, for every ki ∈ Ki, let A¯i
si
denote
the set of those actions ai
si
∈ Ai
si
which keep play in Ei
ki
with probability 1. The sets
A¯i
si
are clearly nonempty. We denote the mixed actions of player i on A¯i
si
by X¯i
si
. For
every state s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S, we also let A¯is := A¯
i
si
and X¯is := X¯
i
si
.
Aperiodicity. A maximal cummunicating set Ei
ki
of player i is called aperiodic,
if there exists a number m such that, for any initial state in Ei
ki
, if player i plays a
strategy that only uses completely mixed actions on A¯i
si
for all si ∈ Ei
ki
, then the
probability that play at stage m is in state si is positive for all si ∈ Ei
ki
. Of course, this
property is independent of the particular choice of this strategy of player i and remains
valid for all stages larger than m. The notion of aperiodicity captures the idea that
player i can be anywhere in Ei
ki
with positive probability, after a certain finite number
of moves.
For instance, if player i can move from any state si ∈ Ei
ki
to every state ti ∈ Ei
ki
(thus including ti = si) in one single move with a positive probability through an
action in A¯i
si
, then Ei
ki
is obviously aperiodic. On the other hand, a trivial example
of a periodic maximal communicating set is Ei
ki
= {1, . . . , z} , with z ≥ 2, when the
transitions yield a cycle, i.e. player i’s only choice in state si < z is to move to state
si + 1, and in state z to move to state 1.
We will call a product-game aperiodic if all maximal communicating sets, for all
players, are aperiodic. From now on, we will only consider aperiodic product-games,
with the exception of section 4.
Restricted games. Take an arbitrary aperiodic product-game and some k =
(k1, . . . , kn) ∈ K. By restricting the state space to Ek ⊂ S, and the action set of each
player i in any state s ∈ Ek to A¯
i
s, we obtain a restricted game G¯k. Obviously, G¯k is
an aperiodic product-game itself, and the underlying Markov transition structure of
any player i is obtained from Γi by restricting player i’s state space to Ei
ki
, and by
restricting player i’s action set in any state si ∈ Ei
ki
to A¯i
si
.
These restricted games play a key role in the analysis of product-games, which is
due to the following observation. As is pointed out above, regardless the initial state
and the strategies of the players, each player i eventually settles in one of his maximal
10
2,−2 0, 0
→ (1, 1) → (1, 2)
0, 0 0, 0
→ (2, 1) → (2, 2)
state (1, 1)
0, 0
→ (1, 2)
1, 1
→ (2, 2)
state (1, 2)
3,−1 0, 0
→ (1, 1) → (1, 2)
0, 0 0, 0
→ (3, 1) → (3, 2)
state (2, 1)
−2, 0
→ (1, 2)
0, 0
→ (3, 2)
state (2, 2)
0, 0 0, 0
→ (3, 1) → (3, 2)
state (3, 1)
1,−1
→ (3, 2)
state (3, 2)
Figure 1: Game of Example 1
communicating sets Ei
ki
. This yields a joint maximal communicating set Ek = ×
n
i=1E
i
ki
,
which the players will never leave. Since actions outside A¯is, for any player i and in any
state s ∈ Ek, would leave Ek with a positive probability, this means that such actions
will be taken only finitely many times, with probability 1. Hence, with probability 1,
play will eventually settle in a restricted game G¯k. The study of these restricted games
is therefore of great importance.
Example 1. As an illustration, consider the product-game with two players given
in figure 1. This is a game with six states. In each state, the actions of player 1 are
represented by the rows, while the actions of player 2 by the columns. So each cell
of each state corresponds to a pair of actions. In each cell, the two payoffs to the
respective players are given in the upper-left corner, while the next state is indicated in
the bottom-right corner. In this game all the transitions are pure, i.e. each transition
probability distribution assigns probability 1 to a certain state.
The underlying Markov transition structure for player 1 is given by state space
S1 = {1, 2, 3} , action sets
A11 = A
1
2 = {1, 2} , A
1
3 = {1} ,
11
and transitions
p111 = (1, 0, 0), p
1
12 = (0, 1, 0), p
1
21 = (1, 0, 0), p
1
22 = (0, 0, 1), p
1
31 = (0, 0, 1).
So in state 1, player 1 can either stay or leave for state 2, from state 2 he can either
go to state 1 or to state 3, while state 3 is absorbing. Regarding the classification of
the states in S1, both E1I := {1, 2} and E
1
II := {3} are maximal communicating sets.
Moreover, they are both aperiodic. Since player 1 can leave E1I but not state 3, we have
K1 = {I, II} and K∗1 = {II} . As for the actions which keep play in these maximal
communicating sets, we obtain A¯11 = {1, 2}, A¯
1
2 = {1}, A¯
1
3 = {1}.
The underlying Markov transition structure for player 2 is given by state space
S2 = {1, 2} , action sets A21 = {1, 2} , A
2
2 = {1} , and transitions p
2
11 = (1, 0), p
2
12 =
(0, 1), p221 = (0, 1). Further, both E
2
I := {1} and E
2
II := {2} are aperiodic maximal
communicating sets, with K2 = {I, II} and K∗2 = {II} , and A¯21 = A¯
2
2 = {1}.
As all maximal communicating sets are aperiodic, we may conclude that the game
is aperiodic as well. Finally, we have K = {I, II}2, which yields four joint maximal
communicating sets and four corresponding restricted games. For example, E(I,I) =
{1, 2} × {1}, and the corresponding restricted game G¯(I,I) consists of cells (1, 1) and
(2, 1) in state (1, 1) and cell (1, 1) in state (2, 1).
2.3 The structure of the minmax-levels
We refer to section 3.1 for the formal discussion. Recall that the rewards corresponding
to a 0-equilibrium are always individually rational, i.e. the equilibrium reward for each
player i from any initial state s is at least his minmax-level vis. It is therefore essential,
for the construction of 0-equilibria, to learn more about the minmax-levels of the players
in these product-games.
The analysis of the minmax-levels is split into three sub-steps. In section 2.3.1,
we study the minmax-levels of the players in the restricted-games. Then, in section
2.3.2., we introduce the notion of simple product-games and explore the structure of
their minmax-levels. Finally, in section 2.3.3, by combining the first two sub-steps, we
are able to demonstrate the most essential structural properties of the minmax-levels
in general product-games.
2.3.1 The minmax-level v¯k of a restricted game G¯k
Consider a restricted game G¯k corresponding to the joint maximal communicating set
Ek, for some k = (k
1, . . . , kn) ∈ K. Let v¯ik,s denote each player i’s minmax-level in G¯k
12
for initial state s ∈ Ek. By using the aperiodicity of each E
i
ki
and that each player i can
go from any state in Ei
ki
to any other one in Ei
ki
, we will be able to show that any player
i’s minmax-level v¯ik,s in G¯k is constant on the whole state space Ek of G¯k (cf. lemma
1). This means that the players are indifferent between the states in Ek, as far as their
minmax-levels in G¯k are concerned. It will also follow that for any player i, players −i
have a joint stationary strategy which guarantees within G¯k that player i’s reward from
any initial state s ∈ Ek is at most his minmax-level v¯
i
k,s. In other words, the infimum in
expression (6) is attained at joint stationary strategies, for all restricted games. This
will become important later, as our ultimate goal is the existence of 0-equilibria, which
do not allow even small positive error terms.
As an illustration, we now revisit the game in example 1. Take first the restricted
game G¯(I,I), consisting of cells (1, 1) and (2, 1) in state (1, 1) and cell (1, 1) in state
(2, 1). Let us examine player 1’s minmax-level v¯1(I,I) in G¯(I,I). In G¯(I,I), it is only player
1 who has a choice and only in state (1, 1). By choosing the first action, he receives
payoff 2, while by playing the second one he receives payoff 0 and subsequently payoff
3 in state (2, 1) before returning to state (1, 1). As the second action gives payoff 3/2
on average, we may conclude that he cannot do better than to keep on choosing action
1 in state (1, 1). Hence, for both initial states in G¯(I,I), player 1’s minmax-level v¯
1
(I,I)
is 2, whereas, for similar reasons, player 2’s minmax-level v¯2(I,I) is −2. Thus, both
minmax-levels are constant on the state space E(I,I) = {(1, 1), (2, 1)} of G¯(I,I).
Now consider the restricted game G¯(I,II), consisting of the whole state (1, 2) and the
upper cell in state (2, 2). By using similar arguments, player 1’s minmax-level v¯1(I,II) is
0, and player 2’s minmax-level v¯2(I,II) is also 0 for both initial states in G¯(I,II).
Finally, the restricted games G¯(II,I) and G¯(II,II) are both trivial, i.e. they consist of
one single state and one action for both players. In G¯(II,I), both minmax-levels v¯
1
(II,I)
and v¯2(II,I) are equal to 0, whereas in G¯(II,II), player 1’s minmax-level v¯
1
(II,II) equals 1
and player 2’s minmax-level v¯2(II,II) equals −1.
2.3.2 The minmax-levels in simple product-games
We now examine a special class of product-games. We call a product-game G simple if
it holds for all restricted games G¯k that, for all players i, all payoffs to player i within
G¯k are equal. This way, all restricted games are trivial.
For the minmax-levels of the players in simple product-games, we will derive sev-
eral results. These results will be illustrated throughout this section by the following
example.
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2,−2 0, 0
→ (1, 1) → (1, 2)
2,−2 0, 0
→ (2, 1) → (2, 2)
state (1, 1)
0, 0
→ (1, 2)
0, 0
→ (2, 2)
state (1, 2)
2,−2 0, 0
→ (1, 1) → (1, 2)
0, 0 0, 0
→ (3, 1) → (3, 2)
state (2, 1)
0, 0
→ (1, 2)
0, 0
→ (3, 2)
state (2, 2)
0, 0 0, 0
→ (3, 1) → (3, 2)
state (3, 1)
1,−1
→ (3, 2)
state (3, 2)
Figure 2: Game of Example 2
Example 2: Consider the simple product-game G with two players given in figure
2. The underlying Markov transition structures are identical to those in example 1.
Hence, this game is aperiodic as well. Actually, this game is obtained from the game
in example 1 by replacing all payoffs for player 1 by 2 and for player 2 by −2 in the
restricted game G¯(I,I), and all payoffs for either player by 0 in the restricted game
G¯(I,II). Hence, the only possible pair of payoffs is (2,−2) in G(I,I), and (0, 0) in G¯(I,II).
Finally, for restricted game G¯(II,I), the only possible pair of payoffs remained (0, 0),
while in G¯(II,II), it remained (1,−1). So, the game is simple, indeed. In fact, this is a
zero-sum game, but we will not pay much attention to this aspect.
Let us examine the players’ minmax-levels in G. For player 1, we will argue that
v1(1,1) = v
1
(1,2) = v
1
(2,1) = v
1
(2,2) = v
1
(3,2) = 1, v
1
(3,1) = 0.
Player 1’s minmax-level is clearly 0 for initial state (3, 1), in view of player 2’s first
action. Now consider an arbitrary other initial state s ∈ S − {(3, 1)}. By moving to
his second state, player 2 can always make sure that player 1’s reward is at most 1.
On the other hand, player 1 can guarantee reward 1 for state s by the pure stationary
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strategy x1 defined as
x1(1,1) = (1, 0), x
1
(1,2) = (0, 1) , x
1
(2,1) = (1, 0), x
1
(2,2) = (0, 1), x
1
(3,1) = x
1
(3,2) = (1).
Hence, player 1’s minmax-level equals 1 for all s ∈ S − {(3, 1)}, indeed. We similarly
find that v2s = −v
1
s for all s ∈ S.
Given this example, we would like now to explain and to illustrate the most im-
portant results that we will achieve regarding the minmax-levels of simple aperiodic
product-games. The explanation below of each of these results is given for an arbitrary
simple aperiodic product-game G, which is then followed by an illustration with the
help of example 2.
Observation A (cf. lemma 2). In any state s ∈ S, even if any player i had a
“solitary move”, i.e. he could play an action while every other player j remains in the
same state sj , he cannot improve on his minmax-level vi in expectation. Similarly,
players −i cannot decrease player i’s minmax-level vi in expectation by executing a
solitary move. (This important result heavily relies on the aperiodicity of the product-
game, and would fail in general, cf. section 4.) Consider in example 2, for instance,
state (2, 1) and a solitary move for player 1. Now given player 2 stays in state 1, player
1’s first action yields state (1, 1), while the second one state (3, 1). As v1(2,1) = v
1
(1,1) = 1
and v1(3,1) = 0, player 1 is indeed unable to improve on his minmax-level by such a
solitary move.
Observation B (cf. lemma 4). On any joint maximal communicating set Ek, each
player i’s minmax-level vi is constant. In example 2, for instance, on both states of
E(I,I), player 1’s minmax-level is 1.
Observation C (cf. lemma 5). If player i is in a state of type 2, then the actions
of the corresponding restricted game provide the best possible transitions with respect
to the expected minmax-level vi, regardless the actions of the opponents. Somewhat
similarly, if players −i all play actions in a restricted game, then player i’s minmax-level
cannot increase in expectation. In example 2, consider, for instance, player 1 in state
(2, 1). If player 1 plays his first action (the action of the restricted game G¯(I,I)) then his
minmax-level will remain 1, regardless the action chosen by player 2. Therefore, action
2 can never be better than action 1 for player 1, with respect to player 1’s expected
minmax-level after transition.
Observation D (cf. lemma 6). In any restricted game G¯k, if any player i’s unique
reward in G¯k is strictly less than his minmax-level v
i on Ek (which is constant on Ek, cf.
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observation B above), then player i is able to leave G¯k (or actually the set of states Ek)
in a satisfactory way. More precisely, player i has a state si ∈ Ei
ki
and a corresponding
pure “exit” action ai
si
such that by playing ai
si
in any state t ∈ Ek with t
i = si, play
leaves Ek with a positive probability and at the same time player i’s minmax-level
cannot decrease in expectation, regardless the actions of the opponents. As player i
can move to si from any state in Ei
ki
, he is always able on his own to make play leave
such an “unfavorable” Ek. Similarly, if player i’s unique reward in G¯k is strictly larger
than his minmax-level vi on Ek, then players −i are able to leave G¯k in an analogous
manner. As an illustration, in example 2, consider the restricted game G¯(I,II), in which
player 1’s unique reward is 0 while his minmax-level v1 is 1. Indeed, player 1 can
leave G¯(I,II) by moving to state (2, 2) (or actually to state 2 ∈ E
1
(I,II)) and playing
his second action there. Note that by playing this action, player 1’s minmax-level v1
remains unchanged. Similarly, player 2 is unsatisfied with the restricted game G¯(I,I),
as his unique reward is −2, which is strictly less than his minmax-level on E(I,I), which
equals −1. Notice that player 2 can leave G¯(I,I) by playing his second action, and by
doing so, regardless whether play is in state (1, 1) or in state (2, 1), and regardless the
action chosen by player 1, the minmax-level v2 of player 2 cannot decrease (as −1 is
his lowest minmax-level in the whole game).
2.3.3 The minmax-levels in general product-games
This section is devoted to the analysis of the minmax-levels of the players in the context
of general aperiodic product-games. Take an arbitrary aperiodic product-game G. As
we know from section 2.3.1, the minmax-level v¯ik of each player i in any restricted
game G¯k is constant on the whole state space Ek of G¯k. Let G˜ denote the simple
aperiodic product-game which is derived from G by replacing each player i’s payoffs in
any restricted game G¯k by his minmax-level v¯
i
k. Let w
i
s denote player i’s minmax-level
in G˜ from initial state s. For an illustration, we refer to the game in example 2 (which is
now game G˜ with minmax-levels w), which is obtained exactly by this very procedure
from the game in example 1 (which is now game G with minmax-levels v). Recall for
this example that w1(3,1) = w
2
(3,1) = 0 while w
1
s = 1 and w
2
s = −1 for all s ∈ S−{(3, 1)}.
The transformation above of G into G˜ is of course very natural, and we will be able
to show in general that the minmax-levels of the players remain unchanged under this
transformation (cf. lemma 7), i.e. wis = v
i
s for all players i and all initial states s ∈ S.
Let us explain in detail why wis ≥ v
i
s holds in general. For this it is sufficient to show
that players −i have a joint stationary strategy x−i which guarantees in the original
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game G that player i’s (expected) reward is not more than wis for any initial state s.
In our illustrative game in example 1, for i = 2, one can take the stationary strategy
y1(= x−2) for player 1 defined as
y1(1,1) = (1, 0), y
1
(1,2) = (0, 1) , y
1
(2,1) = (1, 0), y
1
(2,2) = (0, 1), y
1
(3,1) = y
1
(3,2) = (1),
which guarantees in G that player 2’s reward is not more than w2s for all initial states
s ∈ S. Now we turn back to the general case, but we will indicate between brackets the
corresponding events in this example.
As is pointed out in observation B in section 2.3.2, wis is a constant w
i
k on each
Ek. Thus, we obtained two constants v¯
i
k and w
i
k for any player i in any joint maximal
communicating set Ek. Now, players −i should use a joint stationary strategy x
−i which
prescribes to play, roughly speaking, as follows:
1. In any joint maximal communicating set Ek in which v¯
i
k ≤ w
i
k, players −i should
play a joint stationary strategy in G¯k which guarantees in G¯k that player i’s reward
is not more than v¯ik. Such a joint stationary strategy exists, as is discussed in section
2.3.1. (In our example, this happens with y1 in E(I,I), E(II,I) and E(II,II).)
2. In any joint maximal communicating set Ek in which v¯
i
k > w
i
k, players −i should
leave Ek, as is discussed in observation D (with respect to the minmax-level w
i of the
game G˜) in section 2.3.2 above. This can be done in a stationary way by moving to
the joint states where exit can take place and then playing the joint “exit” actions. (In
our example, this happens with y1 in E(I,II).)
3. In states in which at least one player is in a state of type 1, players −i should play
joint mixed actions which take care that the value of wi cannot increase in expectation
after transition. Such joint actions obviously exist, as wi is the minmax-level of game
G˜. (In our example, there are no such states.)
We will now argue that x−i guarantees in G that player i cannot receive a reward
higher than wis for any initial state s, as desired. Take an arbitrary stationary strategy
xi for player i and an arbitrary initial state s. Consider the joint stationary strategy
(xi, x−i). First notice that the value of wi cannot increase in expectation during play.
For case 3 it is immediate. On the other hand, in cases 1 and 2, players −i always use
actions of the corresponding restricted game or they leave Ek with a joint “exit” action.
And indeed, in both cases, as is discussed in observations C and D (with respect to the
minmax-level wi of the game G˜) in section 2.3.2, wi cannot increase in expectation.
As we know, with respect to (xi, x−i) and initial state s, play eventually settles,
with probability 1, in a restricted game. Let ξ denote the random variable for the index
of this restricted game (so play settles in restricted game G¯ξ). Since w
i cannot increase
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in expectation during play, it follows that wiξ is then at most w
i
s in expectation, i.e.
Es,(xi,x−i)(w
i
ξ) ≤ w
i
s. Because Eξ can only fall under case 1, and not case 2 due to the
“exit” actions, we have for player i’s reward (in G) that
γis(x
i, x−i) ≤ Es,(xi,x−i)(v¯
i
ξ) ≤ Es,(xi,x−i)(w
i
ξ) ≤ w
i
s.
As xi was arbitrary and player i has a stationary best reply to x−i, we conclude that
x−i guarantees in the original game G that player i’s reward is not more than wis for
any initial state s. This implies wis ≥ v
i
s, as desired.
One can similarly show that wis ≤ v
i
s, yielding w
i
s = v
i
s for all players i and all initial
states s ∈ S. This has important consequences.
First, x−i thus guarantees in the original game G that player i’s reward is not more
than vis for any initial state s. This implies, in the context of two-player aperiodic
zero-sum product-games, that the stationary strategy x−1 of player 2 (as −1 = {2})
guarantees that player 1’s reward is not more than v1s for any initial state s. Hence,
x−1 is 0-optimal for player 2. One similarly finds that x−2 is 0-optimal for player 1.
Thus, both players have stationary 0-optimal strategies (cf. the end of section 3.1.3),
which proves Main Theorem 2.
Second, the structural properties (i.e. observations A,B,C and D) that we achieved
in section 2.3.2 for the minmax-levels of simple product-games are now applicable to
all product-games (cf. corollary 8). With this knowledge on the minmax-levels, we are
now sufficiently prepared to tackle the problem of the existence of 0-equilibria.
2.4 The construction of 0-equilibria in general product-games
Take an arbitrary aperiodic product-game G. In this section, we will show that there
exists a 0-equilibrium in G, as is claimed by Main Theorem 1. The construction will
make extensive use of the results we obtained for the minmax-levels of the players.
The first step again is to examine the existence of equilibria in the restricted games.
We will show for any restricted game G¯k (cf. lemma 10) that there exists a 0-equilibrium
σk in G¯k such that the corresponding rewards are independent of the initial state and all
the continuation rewards remain unchanged with probability 1 during the whole play.
More precisely, if σk induces reward z
i
k ∈ R for some player i, then γ¯
i
s(σk[h]) = z
i
k holds
for every state s ∈ Ek and for every history h with a positive probability of occurrence
with respect to σk. Here γ¯
i denotes player i’s average reward in the restricted game
G¯k. So if no player deviates, every player i’s future expectations remain z
i
k during the
whole play. This will guarantee that no player will change his mind and decides to
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leave Ek just because a certain history took place. Since σk is a 0-equilibrium in G¯k,
we have zik ≥ v¯
i
k for all players i, where v¯
i
k is the minmax-level of player i in G¯k (v¯
i
k is
constant on Ek, as we know from section 2.3.1).
The idea of the proof that such a 0-equilibrium σk exists in G¯k is simple. Notice
first that, as the state space Ek of G¯k is a joint maximal communicating set and each
Ei
ki
is aperiodic, the players can move from any state in Ek to any other one in Ek,
possibly in a number of steps, if they wish so. Thus, the set of feasible rewards (i.e. the
rewards that can be obtained by some joint strategy) is the same from any initial state
in Ek. Moreover, we also know that each player i’s minmax-level v¯
i
k in G¯k is constant
on Ek. Hence, this game situation in G¯k is fairly similar to an ordinary repeated game,
and the construction of such a σk is then a simple task by applying ideas and arguments
taken from the well-known Folk-theorem for repeated games.
Hence, we may fix a 0-equilibrium σk with some reward zk in every restricted game
G¯k. Fix further, for every player i, a joint stationary strategy y
−i for players −i which
guarantees in the original game G that player i’s reward is not more than vis for any
initial state s. Such joint stationary strategies exist, as is discussed in the first conclusion
at the end of section 2.3.3 (where we used the notation x−i for such a joint stationary
strategy).
We are now ready to discuss the proof of Main Theorem 1, which claimed the
existence of a 0-equilibrium η in G. The proof is constructive by nature. The main
body of the proof is to construct a joint strategy pi with important properties, amongst
others that:
property (1): the rewards for pi are individually rational, i.e. γis(pi) ≥ v
i
s for all
initial states s ∈ S and for all players i;
property (2): no player i has an incentive to deviate from pii inside the support of
pii, i.e. by redistributing the probabilities over the actions to which pii would assign
a positive probability (such deviations are difficult to detect, as player i still chooses
actions which have positive probability according to pii).
The joint strategy η will then, roughly speaking, prescribe to play as follows: the
players play the joint strategy pi as long as no player i deviates from pii by playing
an action on which pii puts probability zero. If player i deviates in such a way, then
from the next state, say state s, players −i switch to the joint strategy y−i and play
it for the rest of the time. By doing so, they push down player i’s reward to a level of
at most vis. As pi induces individually rational rewards, y
−i acts as a threat strategy,
which forces player i to follow the prescriptions of pii. The use of such threat strategies
for the construction of equilibria is standard in the theory of stochastic games.
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Now the remaining task is to construct pi. For simplicity, suppose that there are
no states of type 1. As we know, states of type 1 have a transient nature, and while
those states will cause no fundamental difficulties in the formal proofs, they do involve
some technicalities (we would have to define two additional auxiliary games). So, by
this assumption, S splits up into joint maximal communicating sets. Now pi prescribes
for the players to play as follows. On each joint maximal communicating set Ek, we
compare the rewards zk that the players could obtain as an equilibrium reward inside
G¯k with the minmax-levels of the players in the original game G, which are some
constant vk on Ek according to observation B in section 2.3.2 (and the final conclusion
of section 2.3.3 as well). Now, if play enters an ergodic set Ek in which z
i
k ≥ v
i
k for all
players i, then G¯k is a “satisfactory” restricted game and pi prescribes to switch to σk
and collect reward zk. On the other hand, if play enters an ergodic set Ek in which
zik < v
i
k for some player i while z
j
k ≥ v
j
k for all players j < i, then player i is unsatisfied
with G¯k, and pi lets accordingly player i leave G¯k as is given in observation D in section
2.3.2 (cf. the final conclusion of section 2.3.3 as well). As long as player i has not made
the exit yet, players −i will simply play a joint stationary strategy in the restricted
game G¯k which guarantees that player i cannot receive more than v¯
i
k inside G¯k. Such a
strategy exists as is mentioned in section 2.3.1. As v¯ik ≤ z
i
k < v
i
k, by doing so, players
−i force player i to eventually leave G¯k.
Notice that pi only prescribes actions within the restricted games, except for the
exit actions. Therefore, it will follow from observations C and D in section 2.3.2 (and
the final conclusion of section 2.3.3) that the joint strategy pi satisfies properties (1)
and (2) above, as desired. Given pi, the construction of the 0-equilibrium η is complete.
This concludes the outline of the proof of Main Theorem 1.
We wish to add that it remains unclear whether 0-equilibria always exist within
the class of stationary strategies. This question is already challenging in the situation
when each player i’s state space Si is just one maximal communicating set (precisely the
situation we have in a restricted game), meaning that S consists of one joint maximal
communicating set. While there are indications that stationary equilibria may exist,
for example that all minmax-levels are constant on the whole state space S, it is still
not evident how one should get a grip on the problem.
Finally, let us revisit example 1. As we know, the minmax-levels of this game
coincide with the minmax-levels of the game in example 2, hence
v1(1,1) = v
1
(1,2) = v
1
(2,1) = v
1
(2,2) = v
1
(3,2) = 1, v
1
(3,1) = 0,
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while v2 = −v1. Now consider the pure stationary strategy x1 for player 1 defined as
x1(1,1) = (1, 0), x
1
(1,2) = (0, 1) , x
1
(2,1) = (1, 0), x
1
(2,2) = (0, 1), x
1
(3,1) = x
1
(3,2) = (1),
and the pure stationary strategy x2 for player 2 given as
x2(1,1) = x
2
(2,1) = (0, 1), x
2
(3,1) = (1, 0), x
2
(1,2) = x
2
(2,2) = x
2
(3,2) = (1).
This pair (x1, x2) actually could play the role of pi in this example. Indeed, each of the
joint maximal communicating sets E(II,I) and E(II,II) is “satisfactory” to the players,
and trivially, (x1, x2) lets the players play a 0-equilibrium in each of the restricted
games G¯(II,I) and G¯(II,II). On the other hand, as we know, G¯(I,I) is unsatisfactory to
player 2 and G¯(I,II) is unsatisfactory to player 1, and x
2 leaves E(I,I) while x
1 leaves
E(I,II) accordingly. Notice that we need no threat strategies here, so (x
1, x2) is a
0-equilibrium.
3 The formal proof of Main Theorems 1 and 2
In this section, we provide a formal proof for Main Theorems 1 and 2. We will focus
on Main Theorem 1, as Main Theorem 2 will follow (cf. the end of section 3.1.3) along
the way without major additional difficulties.
For the main ideas and the intuition behind the proofs, we also refer to the discussion
in section 2. Recall the classification of states for each player’s Markov transition
structure from section 2.2.
3.1 The structure of the minmax-levels
3.1.1 The minmax-levels of the restricted games
Let k = (k1, . . . , kn) ∈ K. As in section 2.3.1, by restricting the state space to Ek =
E1
k1
× · · ·×Enkn and the action set of each player i to A¯
i
s in all states s ∈ Ek, we obtain
a restricted product-game, which we denote by G¯k. Let v¯
i
k,s denote the minmax-level
of player i in G¯k for initial state s ∈ Ek.
Lemma 1 Let G be an arbitrary aperiodic product-game and consider the restricted
game G¯k, for any k = (k
1, . . . , kn) ∈ K, and an arbitrary player i. Then, the minmax-
level v¯ik of any player i in G¯k is constant, i.e. v¯
i
k,s = v¯
i
k,t for all states s, t ∈ Ek.
Moreover, in G¯k, players −i have a joint stationary strategy x
−i which guarantees that
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player i’s reward from any initial state s ∈ Ek is at most his minmax-level v¯
i
k,s, i.e. for
all strategies pii for player i in G¯k we have
γ¯is(pi
i, x−i) ≤ v¯ik,s,
where γ¯ denotes the average reward for the game G¯k.
Proof. Consider such a restricted game G¯k and a player i. Let α
i := mint∈Ek v¯
i
k,t.
As is mentioned in the introduction, by applying Thuijsman & Vrieze [1991] for the
game G¯k, there exists a state s
′ ∈ {t ∈ Ek|v¯
i
k,t = α
i} for which players −i have a joint
stationary strategy x−i such that for all strategies pii for player i in G¯k we have
γ¯is′(pi
i, x−i) ≤ v¯ik,s′ = α
i.
Let Z denote the set of all those states s ∈ {t ∈ Ek|v¯
i
k,t = α
i} for which this x−i
satisfies for all strategies pii for player i in G¯k that
γ¯is(pi
i, x−i) ≤ αi.
Let xi be a completely mixed stationary strategy in G¯k for player i. For the joint
stationary strategy (xi, x−i), take an arbitrary ergodic set F ⊂ Ek which is reached
from some initial state s ∈ Z with a positive probability. Then, by the definition of
x−i, we have F ⊂ Z. Due to the aperiodicity of Ei
ki
and the definition of xi, it holds
that if u ∈ F then (ti, u−i) ∈ F for all states ti ∈ Ei
ki
. Thus, the ergodic set F must be
of the form F = F˜ × Ei
ki
for some non-empty
F˜ ⊂ E−i
k−i
= ×j∈N−{i}E
j
kj
.
Define a joint stationary strategy y−i for players −i in G¯k as follows: let y
−i
t = x
−i
t
for all t ∈ F and let y−it be an arbitrary completely mixed action on A¯
−i
t for all
t ∈ (Ek−F ). Now, y
−i satisfies the following two properties, regardless the initial state
and player i’s strategy in G¯k.
Property 1: play eventually visits F. This follows from the observation that players
−i eventually visit F˜ , due to the aperiodicity of Ej
kj
for all j 6= i and the choice of y−i
outside F.
Property 2: once play reaches F , it will never leave it. This is so because F was
closed with respect to (xi, x−i) and y−i equals x−i on F.
In view of
F ⊂ Z ⊂ {t ∈ Ek|v¯
i
k,t = α
i},
22
property 1 implies that the minmax-level v¯ik of player i in G¯k equals the constant α
i,
so the first part of the lemma follows.
We finally show that y−i satisfies the second part of the lemma. Let yi be a
stationary best reply of player i against y−i in G¯k, and consider the joint stationary
strategy (yi, y−i). Suppose U is an ergodic set with respect to (yi, y−i). Then, by
properties 1 and 2, we have U ⊂ F , and hence U ⊂ Z as well. Because y−i equals x−i
on F , it follows for all u ∈ U that
γ¯iu(y
i, y−i) ≤ αi.
Since play eventually reaches an ergodic set, we conclude
γ¯iu(y
i, y−i) ≤ αi = v¯ik,u
for all initial states u ∈ Ek. For y
i is a best reply to y−i, we proved that y−i satisfies
the second part of the lemma.
We remark that if ki ∈ K∗i for all players i, then for all initial states in Ek, the
restricted game G¯k is strategically equivalent to the original game G, and therefore
v¯ik,s = v
i
s for all players i and for all states s ∈ Ek. In view of the previous lemma,
minmax-level vi of any player i in the original game G is also constant on such an Ek.
3.1.2 The minmax-levels in simple product-games
We call a product-game G simple if it holds within any restricted game G¯k for any
player i that, all payoffs to player i are equal, i.e. for any k ∈ K and for any player
i, we have ris(as) = r
i
s(bs) for any state s ∈ Ek and for any joint actions as, bs ∈ A¯s.
Hence, in simple product-games, all restricted games are trivial.
The following lemma deals with “solitary moves” of the players, as is described in
property A in section 2.3.2.
Lemma 2 Let G be a simple aperiodic product-game. Take an arbitrary player i and
a state s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S.
(1) For any action ais ∈ A
i
s of player i, it holds that∑
ti∈Si
pisiais
(ti) vi(ti,s−i) ≤ v
i
s.
(2) For any joint action a−is ∈ A
−i
s of players −i, it holds that∑
t−i∈S−i
p−i
s−ia−is
(t−i) vi(t−i,si) ≥ v
−i
s .
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Proof. We only show part (1) of the lemma; part (2) can be proven similarly. Take
an arbitrary state s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S, a player i and an action ais of player i in state
s. Let ε > 0. The idea of the proof is as follows. We construct a joint strategy (σi, pi−i)
for initial state s and another joint strategy (pii, σ−i) for all initial states of the form
(ti, s−i), with ti ∈ Si; for other initial states the joint strategies are arbitrary. These
joint strategies will have the properties:
Property (a): with respect to (σi, pi−i) and initial state s, player i’s reward is at
most his minmax-level up to ε, i.e. γis(σ
i, pi−i) ≤ vis + ε.
Property (b): with respect to (pii, σ−i) and any initial state of the form (ti, s−i),
player i’s reward is at least his minmax-level up to ε, i.e. γi
(ti,s−i)
(pii, σ−i) ≥ vi
(ti,s−i)
−ε.
Property (c): player i’s expected reward is the same with respect to the following
two ways of playing from initial state s: (i) according to (σi, pi−i) and (ii) player i
first executes the solitary move ais in state s, by which play moves to a state of the
form (ti, s−i), and subsequently from state (ti, s−i) the players start playing (pii, σ−i).
Formally,
γis(σ
i, pi−i) =
∑
ti∈Si
pi
siai
si
(ti) · γi(ti,s−i)(pi
i, σ−i).
Properties (a) and (b) will follow immediately from the definitions of the strategies,
cf. step 1 below. On the other hand, property (c) will be implied by the observation,
cf. step 2 below, that play will settle in any restricted game G¯k with equal probabilities
with respect to both ways of playing as mentioned in property (c). At this point, it is
essential that the game is simple and therefore all payoffs within any G¯k are identical.
It follows from properties (a), (b) and (c) that
vis + ε ≥ γ
i
s(σ
i, pi−i) (8)
=
∑
ti∈Si
pi
siai
si
(ti) · γi(ti,s−i)(pi
i, σ−i)
≥
∑
ti∈Si
pi
siai
si
(ti) ·
(
vi(ti,s−i) − ε
)
=
∑
ti∈Si
pi
siai
si
(ti) · vi(ti,s−i) − ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary, the proof will then be complete.
Step 1. The construction of two joint strategies: (σi, pi−i) for initial state s and
(pii, σ−i) for all initial states of the form (ti, s−i). Before the construction of the
strategies, we define two maps φ and ψ, both of which will “transform” possible histories
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of play. More precisely, φ will transform histories with initial state s into histories with
initial states of the form (ti, s−i), while ψ will do it the other way around.
Let sm denote the state that play visited at stage m and let am denote the joint
action played by the players in state sm at stage m. The history up to stage m is then
the sequence hm = (s1, a1; s2, a2; . . . ; sm, am). For initial state s1 = s, let φ(hm) denote
the sequence of states and joint actions
φ(hm) := ((s
i
2, s
−i
1 ), (a
i
2, a
−i
1 ); (s
i
3, s
−i
2 ), (a
i
3, a
−i
2 ); . . . ; (s
i
m, s
−i
m−1), (a
i
m, a
−i
m−1)),
which is derived from hm by simply letting player i one step ahead of players −i. Note
that, as the action space of a player j in a product-game only depends on the j-th
coordinate of the state, the sequence φ(hm) could arise as a possible history up to
stage m− 1 (as it consists of m− 1 states and m− 1 corresponding joint actions) with
initial state (si2, s
−i) = (si2, s
−i
1 ). For infinite histories, φ is defined similarly.
For an initial state s1 = (t
i, s−i), for some ti ∈ Si, we also define the transformation
ψ for hm by
ψ(hm) := (s, (a
i
s, a
−i
1 ); (s
i
1, s
−i
2 ), (a
i
1, a
−i
2 ); . . . ; (s
i
m−1, s
−i
m ), (a
i
m−1, a
−i
m )),
where s and ais are the state and action that we fixed initially. (The notation ψ
s,ais
would be more precise to indicate the dependence of ψ on s and ais, but since we only
consider one s and one ais througout this proof, we omit the upper index here.) Note
that ψ(hm) could arise as a possible history up to stage m (as it consists of m states
and m corresponding joint actions) with initial state s. In ψ(hm), it is now players −i
who are one step ahead of player i.
Note that if s1 = s and a
i
1 = a
i
s (the state and action we fixed initially) then
ψ(φ(hm)) = hm−1. (9)
We start with the strategies for players −i. In view of the definition of the minmax-
level, there exists a joint strategy pi−i of players −i such that player i’s reward from
initial state s cannot be more than his minmax-level up to ε, i.e. γis(τ
i, pi−i) ≤ vis + ε
for all strategies τ i of player i.
Given pi−i, define a history-dependent strategy σ−i for players −i for every initial
state s1 of the form s1 = (t
i, s−i), for some ti ∈ Si, as follows. For stage 1 in state s1
(with empty history of play) let
σ−is1 (∅) := pi
−i
s (∅),
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where s = (s1, . . . , sn) is the state we fixed initially, and in general for stage m ≥ 2 in
state sm with past history hm−1 = (s1, a1; s2, a2; . . . ; sm−1, am−1) let
σ−ism (hm−1) := pi
−i
(sim−1,s
−i
m )
(ψ(hm−1)).
In words, in initial state s1 at stage 1, the joint strategy σ
−i prescribes for players −i
to follow pi−i as if the initial state was state s, while in state sm at stage m ≥ 2, to
follow pi−i as if the past history was ψ(hm−1) and the present state was (s
−i
m , s
i
m−1).
Now we define the strategies for player i. By the definition of the minmax-level
once more, there also exists a strategy pii for player i which defends the minmax-level
against σ−i up to ε, i.e. γit(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ vit − ε for all initial states t.
Given pii, define also a strategy σi for player i for initial state s1 = s (for other
initial states, σi is arbitrary) as follows. For stage 1 in state s1 let
σis1 (∅) := a
i
s,
where s and ais are the state and action that we fixed initially, and in general for stage
m ≥ 2 in state sm with past history hm−1 let
σism (hm−1) := pi
i
(sim,s
−i
m−1)
(φ(hm−1)).
In words, in state s1 = s at stage 1, the strategy σ
i prescribes for player i to play action
ais, while in state sm at stage m ≥ 2, to follow pi
i as if the past history was φ(hm−1)
and the present state was (sim, s
−i
m−1).
Note that, by the definitions of pi−i and pii, we have
γis(σ
i, pi−i) ≤ vis + ε (10a)
and
γi(ti,s−i)(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ vi(ti,s−i) − ε ∀t
i ∈ Si. (11)
This completes step 1.
Step 2. The relation between the histories with respect to defined joint strategies
(σi, pi−i) and (pii, σ−i). Since, σi and σ−i are defined with mixed actions used by pii
and pi−i respectively, there is an important relation between the occurrence probabilities
of the histories with respect to the joint strategies (σi, pi−i) and (pii, σ−i).
Take a possible history hm = (s1, a1; . . . ; sm, am) up to stage m with initial state
s1 = s and initial action a
i
1 = a
i
s for player i from state s. Let
{
hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1)
}
26
denote the event that the history up to stage m coincides with hm, and additionally,
player i is in state sim+1 at stage m + 1 and he plays action a
i
m+1 in state s
i
m+1 at
stage m + 1. Note that φ(hm+1) does not include s
−i
m+1 and a
−i
m+1, so it is clear which
sequence we mean by φ(hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1)). Let
{
φ(hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1))
}
denote the
event that the history up to stage m coincides with φ(hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1)).
We will now show that for all stages m
Ps,(σi,pi−i)
{
hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1)
}
= pisiais
(si2) · P(si
2
,s−i),(pii,σ−i)
{
φ(hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1))
}
(12)
for every possible history hm up to stage m with initial state s1 = s and initial action
ai1 = a
i
s for player i (this is the action that σ
i prescribes with probability 1) and for
every state sim+1 and action a
i
m+1 for player i.
We use induction on m. For any strategy τ j of any player j, let τ jt (a
j
t |h) denote
the probability that the mixed action τ jt (h) puts on action a
j
t . Take first m = 1. By
the definitions of the strategies, the lefthandside of (12) equals
Ps,(σi,pi−i)
{
(s, a1) ∗ (s
i
2, a
i
2)
}
= pi−is (a
−i
1 |∅) · p
i
siais
(si2) · pi
i
(si
2
,s−i)(a
i
2|∅),
where we used that σi prescribes ai1 = a
i
s with probability 1 at stage 1 in state s1 = s
and also that the mixed action prescribed by σi in state s2 at stage 2 equals the mixed
action pii
(si
2
,s−i)
(∅). On the other hand, the righthandside of (12) equals
pisiais
(si2) · P(si
2
,s−i),(pii,σ−i)
{
((si2, s
−i); (ai2, a
−i
1 ))
}
= pisiais
(si2) · pi
i
(si
2
,s−i)(a
i
2|∅) · pi
−i
s (a
−i
1 |∅),
where for the last factor we used that the mixed action prescribed by σ−i in state
(si2, s
−i) at stage 1 equals the mixed action pi−is (∅). Hence, (12) holds for m = 1.
Suppose then that equality (12) is valid for a certain m. For m + 1 we obtain by the
definition of the strategies in a similar way that the lefthandside of (12) equals
Ps,(σi,pi−i)
{
hm+1 ∗ (s
i
m+2, a
i
m+2)
}
(13)
= Ps,(σi,pi−i)
{
hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1)
}
· p−i
s−im a
−i
m
(s−im+1) · pi
−i
sm+1
(a−im+1|hm)
· pi
sim+1a
i
m+1
(sim+2) · pi
i
(sim+2,s
−i
m+1)
(aim+2|φ(hm+1)),
where for the last factor we used
σism+2(hm+1) = pi
i
(sim+2,s
−i
m+1)
(φ(hm+1)).
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On the other hand, the righthandside of (12) equals
pisiais
(si2) · P(si
2
,s−i),(pii,σ−i)
{
φ(hm+1 ∗ (s
i
m+2, a
i
m+2))
}
(14)
= pisiais
(si2) · P(si
2
,s−i),(pii,σ−i)
{
φ(hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1))
}
· pi
sim+1a
i
m+1
(sim+2) · pi
i
(sim+2,s
−i
m+1)
(aim+2|φ(hm+1)) · p
−i
s−im a
−i
m
(s−im+1) · pi
−i
sm+1
(a−im+1|hm),
where for the last factor we used that in view of equalities (9) we have
σ−i
(sim+2,s
−i
m+1)
(φ(hm ∗ (s
i
m+1, a
i
m+1))) = pi
−i
sm+1
(hm).
In conclusion, from our assumption that (12) holds for m, and from equalities (13) and
(14), it follows that (12) holds for m + 1. Consequently, equality (12) holds for all
stages m ≥ 2.
Step 3. Final conclusions. Recall that, with respect to any initial state and any
joint strategy, play eventually settles, with probability 1, in a restricted game. Since
the game is simple, the average reward is determined by this restricted game.
Let h∞ denote any infinite history, with initial state s, with respect to which play
eventually settles in a restricted game G¯k (and the corresponding set of states Ek =
×ni=1E
i
ki
). Then, with respect to φ(h∞), each player j eventually settles in the same
set Ej
kj
, implying that play eventually settles in G¯k (and Ek) with respect to φ(h
∞)
as well. It is therefore clear by equalities (12) that the probability that this restricted
game is some G¯k with respect to (σ
i, pi−i) with initial state s equals the probability
that this is G¯k when player i first executes the solitary move a
i
s in state s, by which
play moves to a state of the form (ti, s−i), and subsequently from state (ti, s−i), the
players start playing (pii, σ−i). Hence
γis(σ
i, pi−i) =
∑
ti∈Si
pi
siai
si
(ti) · γi(ti,s−i)(pi
i, σ−i).
Combining this with inequalities (10a) and (11), we obtain inequalities (8). As ε > 0
was arbitrary, the proof is complete.
Based on the previous lemma, we are able to derive more structural properties of
the minmax-levels of simple product-games.
Lemma 3 Let G be a simple aperiodic product-game, and Ei
ki
a maximal communi-
cating set for player i, for some ki ∈ Ki.
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(1) For any two states si, ti ∈ Ei
ki
of player i and any joint state s−i ∈ S−i of
players −i, the minmax-level of player i satisfies vi
(si,s−i)
= vi
(ti,s−i)
.
(2) For any two joint states s−i, t−i ∈ E−i
k−i
of players −i and any state si ∈ Si of
player i, the minmax-level of player i satisfies vi
(si,s−i)
= vi
(si,t−i)
.
Proof. We will show part (1); the proof of part 2 is similar. Take an arbitrary
s−i ∈ S−i. Let F i denote those states si ∈ Ei
ki
for which vi
(si,s−i)
≤ vi
(ti,s−i)
for all
ti ∈ Ei
ki
. Suppose by way of contradiction that Ei
ki
− F i is not empty. Take a state
si ∈ F i and an action ai
si
∈ A¯i
si
which moves from state si to a state in Ei
ki
− F i with
a positive probability. Then, the solitary move ai
si
in state (si, s−i) for player i would
improve player i’s minmax-level in expectation, which contradicts part (1) of lemma 2.
Hence, F i = Ei
ki
, and part (1) of the lemma follows.
Lemma 4 Let G be a simple aperiodic product-game, and Ek a joint maximal com-
municating set for some k ∈ K. Then, the minmax-level vi of any player i is constant
on Ek, i.e. v
i
s = v
i
t for all s, t ∈ Ek.
Proof. Take a player i and two arbitrary states s, t ∈ Ek. Then, by applying both
parts of lemma 3, we obtain
vis = v
i
(si,s−i) = v
i
(si,t−i) = v
i
(ti,t−i) = v
i
t,
hence the result.
The following lemma deals with the actions in the sets A¯is, which keep play in the
same maximal communicating set with probability 1.
Lemma 5 Let G be a simple aperiodic product-game. Then, for any player i the
following properties hold.
(1) Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a state such that si belongs to a maximal communicating
set Ei
ki
. Then, regardless the mixed action x−is played by players −i in state s, all the
actions in A¯is guarantee in expectation the best possible minmax-level for player i after
transition, i.e. for any actions ais ∈ A¯
i
s and b
i
s ∈ A
i
s it holds that∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,x
−i
s )
(t) vit ≥
∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
−i
s )
(t) vit.
(2) Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a state such that sj belongs to a maximal communicating
set Ej
kj
for all players j 6= i. Then, all joint actions in A¯−is for players −i in state s
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guarantee in expectation that player i’s minmax-level cannot increase after transition,
i.e. for any joint action a−is ∈ A¯
−i
s and for any action a
i
s ∈ A
i
s it holds that∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,a
−i
s )
(t) vit ≤ v
i
s.
Proof. First we prove part (1). Take an arbitrary mixed action x−is for players −i,
and actions ais ∈ A¯
i
s and b
i
s ∈ A
i
s for player i in state s. Then the transition from state
s according to (bis, x
−i
s ) can be decomposed into the following three subsequent steps.
Step 1. In state s, players −i play x−is while player i stays in E
i
ki
by playing action
ais. By doing so, play moves to a state s¯ with t
i ∈ Ei
ki
.
Step 2. From state s¯, player i gets a sequence of solitary moves in the sense of part
(1) of lemma 2, and returns back to si. This can be achieved in a finite number of
moves, with probability 1, inside the maximal communicating set Ei
ki
. After this step,
the new state is (si, s¯−i), and by lemma 4, player i’s minmax-level remains unchanged,
i.e. vis¯ = v
i
(si,s¯−i)
.
Step 3. In state (si, s¯−i), player i gets a solitary move and he plays action bis. By
part (1) of lemma 2, player i’s minmax-level cannot increase during this step.
It is obvious that these three steps together induce the same transitions from state
s as the joint mixed action (bis, x
−i
s ). As player i’s minmax-level cannot increase during
steps 2 and 3, we conclude that step 1 with (ais, x
−i
s ) must be at least as good as the
three steps together with (bis, x
−i
s ) for the minmax-level of player i. Hence, the proof of
part (1) is now complete.
Part (2) of the lemma follows similarly. One can show just as in part (1), by
applying part (2) of lemma 2, that for all mixed actions xis of player i in state s, for all
joint actions a−is ∈ A¯
−i
s and b
−i
s ∈ A
−i
s∑
t∈S
p
s,(xis,a
−i
s )
(t) vit ≤
∑
t∈S
p
s,(xis,b
−i
s )
(t) vit.
Therefore, in state s, the infimum in equality (7) is attained at all a−is ∈ A¯
−i
s , hence we
have for all a−is ∈ A¯
−i
s and a
i
s ∈ A
i
s that∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,a
−i
s )
(t) vit ≤ v
i
s,
which proves part (2).
The next lemma examines the situation, for simple product-games, when player
i’s (unique) reward in a restricted game G¯k is strictly smaller or strictly larger than
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his minmax-level in the original game (which is a constant by lemma 4). We refer to
observation D in section 2.3.2.
Lemma 6 Let G be a simple aperiodic product-game, and let Ek be a joint maximal
communicating set for some k = (k1, . . . , kn) ∈ K. Let zik denote player i’s unique
reward in the restricted game G¯k, and v
i
k be player i’s minmax-level on Ek in the game
G (a constant, cf. lemma 4).
(1) Suppose zik < v
i
k. Then, there is a state s
i ∈ Ei
ki
and an action ai
si
∈ Ai
si
−A¯i
si
for
player i in state si such that if player i plays action ai
si
in any state s = (si, s−i) ∈ Ek,
with s−i ∈ E−i
k−i
, then player i’s minmax-level cannot decrease in expectation from state
s, regardless the actions played by players −i. More precisely, for any a−is ∈ A
−i
s we
have ∑
t∈S
p
s,(ai
si
,a−is )
(t) vit ≥ v
i
s.
(2) Suppose zik > v
i
k. Then, there is a joint state s
−i ∈ E−i
k−i
of players −i and a
joint action a−i
s−i
∈ A−i
s−i
− A¯−i
s−i
(i.e. at least one player j 6= i plays outside A¯j
sj
) such
that if players −i play joint action a−i
s−i
in any state s = (si, s−i) ∈ Ek, with s
i ∈ Ei
ki
,
then player i’s minmax-level cannot increase in expectation from state s, regardless the
action played by player i. More precisely, for any ais ∈ A
i
s we have∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,a
−i
s−i
)(t) v
i
t ≤ v
i
s.
Proof. We will prove part (1); the proof of part (2) is similar.
Step 1: Choosing state si and action ais. We will first argue that there must be at
least one state s ∈ Ek, joint action b
−i
s ∈ A¯
−i
s and action a
i
s ∈ A
i
s − A¯
i
s such that∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,b
−i
s )
(t) vit ≥ v
i
k. (15)
(In view of part (2) of lemma 5, even equality holds, but this is not needed for the
proof.) Suppose by way of contradiction that (15) does not hold, i.e. there exists an
α > 0 such that ∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,b
−i
s )
(t) vit ≤ v
i
k − α
holds for all s ∈ Ek, b
−i
s ∈ A¯
−i
s and a
i
s ∈ A
i
s − A¯
i
s. For any initial state in Ek, suppose
players −i play in the following way: (1) players −i play an arbitrary joint strategy in
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G¯k as long as player i only plays actions within the restricted game G¯k; (2) as soon
as player i plays an action outside G¯k, say action a
i
s ∈ A
i
s − A¯
i
s in some state s ∈ Ek,
and play moves to some state t, then players −i start playing a joint strategy σ−i in
the original game G which guarantees that player i’s reward is at most vit + α/2 in G.
Then, if player i only plays actions within G¯k, player i’s reward is exactly z
i
k < v
i
k,
while if player i decides to play such an action ais outside G¯k, when players −i play
some joint action b−is , then his reward will be at most∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,b
−i
s )
(t) (vit +
1
2
α) =
∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,b
−i
s )
(t) vit +
1
2
α ≤ vik −
1
2
α.
This would mean that player i is unable to defend vik from initial states in Ek in either
case, which would contradict the definition of the minmax-level vi of player i. Hence,
inequality (15) holds indeed for some s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Ek, joint action b
−i
s ∈ A¯
−i
s and
action ais ∈ A
i
s − A¯
i
s.
Now si and ais are the state and action we were looking for. However, keep the
whole state s and the joint action b−is in mind, as we will use them below as well.
Step 2: Proving that state si and action ais satisfy part (1) of the lemma, for this
particular state s, i.e. for any a−is ∈ A
−i
s we have∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,a
−i
s )
(t) vit ≥ v
i
s.
Take an arbitrary a−is ∈ A
−i
s . The transition from state s according to (a
i
s, a
−i
s ) can be
decomposed into the following three subsequent steps.
Step A. In state s, player i plays action ais while players −i stays in E
−i
k−i
by playing
joint action b−is . By doing so, play moves to a state s¯ with s¯
−i ∈ E−i
k−i
, and by inequality
(15), player i’s minmax-level cannot decrease in expectation during this step.
Step B. From state s¯, players −i get a sequence of solitary moves in the sense of part
(2) of lemma 2, and return back to s−i. This can be achieved in a finite number moves,
with probability 1, inside the joint maximal communicating set E−i
k−i
. After this step,
the new state is (ti, s−i), and by lemma 3, player i’s minmax-level remains unchanged
during step B, i.e. vis¯ = v
i
(ti,s−i)
.
Step C. In state (ti, s−i), players −i get a solitary move and play joint action a−is .
By part (2) of lemma 2, player i’s minmax-level cannot decrease during this step.
It is obvious that these three steps A, B and C together induce the same transitions
from state s as the joint action (ais, a
−i
s ). As player i’s minmax-level cannot decrease
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during all steps, we conclude that∑
t∈S
p
s,(ais,a
−i
s )
(t) vit ≥ v
i
s,
which proves that state si and action ais satisfy part (1) of the lemma, for this particular
state s.
Step 3: Proving that state si and action ais satisfy part (1) of the lemma (not only
for state s, but for all states (si, t−i) ∈ Ek, with t
−i ∈ E−i
k−i
), i.e. for any a−is ∈ A
−i
s
we have ∑
u∈S
p(si,t−i),(ais,a
−i
t−i
)(u) v
i
u ≥ v
i
(si,t−i).
Take an arbitrary t−i ∈ E−i
k−i
and a joint action b−i
t−i
∈ A¯−i
t−i
. By lemma 3, vi is a
constant wi
ui
on {ui} × E−i
k−i
, for any ui ∈ Si. Then, as both b−i
t−i
from joint state t−i
and b−is from joint state s
−i keep play in E−i
k−i
with probability 1, we have∑
u∈S
p(si,t−i),(ais,b
−i
t−i
)(u) v
i
u =
∑
ui∈Si
pisiais
(ui)wiui =
∑
u∈S
p
s,(ais,b
−i
s )
(u) viu,
hence by inequality (15)∑
u∈S
p(si,t−i),(ais,b
−i
t−i
)(u) v
i
u =
∑
u∈S
p
s,(ais,b
−i
s )
(u) viu ≥ v
i
s.
Now similarly to step 2, it follows for all a−i
t−i
that∑
u∈S
p(si,t−i),(ais,a
−i
t−i
)(u) v
i
u ≥ v
i
(si,t−i),
which proves step 3 and part (1) of the lemma.
3.1.3 The minmax-levels of general product-games
Take an arbitrary product-game G. The next lemma presents a natural way of trans-
forming G into a simple product-game G˜, and claims that the minmax-levels of the
players remain unchanged under this transformation.
Lemma 7 Take an arbitrary aperiodic product-game G, with vis denoting the minmax-
level for every player i and for every state s ∈ S. Let v¯ik denote player i’s minmax-level
in any restricted game G¯k (which is constant, cf. lemma 1). Let G˜ denote the simple
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aperiodic product-game which is derived from G by replacing each player i’s payoffs in
any restricted game G¯k by his minmax-level v¯
i
k. Further, let w
i
s denote every player i’s
minmax-level in G˜ in state s.
Then, the minmax-levels of the product-games G and G˜ are equal, i.e. vis = w
i
s for
all players i and for all states s ∈ S.
Proof. Consider the original product-game G and take an arbitrary player i. For
this game G, we will show in step 1 below that players −i have a joint stationary
strategy x−i which guarantees that player i’s reward from any initial state s ∈ S is at
most wis, i.e. for all strategies pi
i for player i we have
γis(pi
i, x−i) ≤ wis.
This yields vis ≤ w
i
s for all states s ∈ S. Then, in step 2, we will prove v
i
s ≥ w
i
s for all
s ∈ S by showing that player i can defend wi in G, i.e. for any initial state s and for
any strategy σ−i for players −i, player i has a strategy pii such that γis(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ wis.
Given steps 1 and 2, we will have vis = w
i
s for all states s, so the proof will then be
complete.
Step 1: Proving that players −i have a joint stationary strategy x−i such that, for all
initial states s and for all strategies pii for player i, we have γis(pi
i, x−i) ≤ wis. Note first
that wis is also a constant w
i
k on any joint maximal communicating set Ek, by lemma
4 for the game G˜. We construct the joint stationary strategy x−i by distinguishing the
following three mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1: States s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S such that sj is of type 1 for at least one player
j (possibly j = i). In any such a state s, let x−is ∈ X
−i
s be a joint mixed action for
players −i such that for any mixed action xis ∈ X
i
s of player i we have∑
t∈S
p
s,(x−is ,xis)
(t)wit ≤ w
i
s.
Obviously, by expression (7) for player i’s minmax-level wi in G˜, such a joint mixed
action exists.
Case 2: States in a joint maximal communicating set Ek for which v¯
i
k ≤ w
i
k. Take
a joint stationary strategy y−i for player i in the corresponding restricted game G¯k
(which is a part of the original game G) as in lemma 1. Then, let x−is = y
−i
s for all
s ∈ Ek.
Case 3: States in a joint maximal communicating set Ek for which v¯
i
k > w
i
k. Take
a joint state t−i ∈ E−i
k−i
and a joint “exit” action a−i
t−i
∈ A¯−i
t−i
, with respect to the
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game G˜ and its minmax-level wi for player i, as in part (2) of lemma 6. Then, for any
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Ek, let x
−i
s = a
−i
t−i
whenever s−i = t−i, and let x−is be an arbitrary
joint completely mixed action on A¯−is whenever s
−i 6= t−i.
Take a stationary best reply xi of player i in G against x−i. We will show that
γis(x
i, x−i) ≤ wis for any initial state s ∈ S.
First, consider an arbitrary ergodic set F for (xi, x−i). As players −i will leave any
set Ek considered in case 3, we conclude that F ⊂ Ek for some Ek in case 2. Since x
i
does not leave F, we also have xis ∈ X¯
i
s for all s ∈ F , meaning that x
i behaves on F as
a stationary strategy in the restricted game G¯k. Hence, by the choice of x
−i in case 2,
we have
γis(x
i, x−i) ≤ v¯ik ≤ w
i
k = w
i
s (16)
for all s ∈ F . As F was an arbitrary ergodic set, we have γis(x
i, x−i) ≤ wis for all states
s that are recurrent for (xi, x−i).
Next, note that wi cannot increase in expectation after transition with respect to
(xi, x−i), i.e. P (xi, x−i)wi ≤ wi. Indeed, for cases 2 and 3 it is guaranteed by part (2)
of lemma 5 and by part (2) of lemma 6 (both applied to wi as the minmax-level of
player i in G˜), while it holds by construction for case 1. Consequently, we also have
Pm(xi, x−i)wi ≤ wi for all m ∈ N, yielding Q(xi, x−i)wi ≤ wi.
By applying equality (5), we now obtain
γi(xi, x−i) = Q(xi, x−i) · γi(xi, x−i) ≤ Q(xi, x−i) · wi ≤ wi,
where the first inequality follows from inequality (16) and from the fact that entry (t, s)
of the stochastic matrix Q(xi, x−i) is only positive if state s is recurrent for (xi, x−i).
Since xi is a best reply to x−i in G, the proof of step 1 is complete.
Step 2: Proving that against any joint strategy σ−i for players −i, player i has a
strategy pii such that γis(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ wis for all initial states s. The proof is quite similar
to step 1. Given a joint strategy σ−i, player i should use a strategy pii which prescribes
to play as follows. First, in states where at least one player is in a state of type 1
(case 1∗, being the counterpart of case 1 in step 1), against any joint mixed action
prescribed by σ−i, player i can just play a mixed action such that wi does not decrease
in expectation. Next, if a joint maximal communicating set Ek satisfies v¯
i
k ≥ w
i
k (case
2∗, being the counterpart of case 2 in step 1), then player i can defend wik against σ
−i
inside G¯k, whereas if Ek satisfies v¯
i
k < w
i
k (case 3
∗, being the counterpart of case 3 in
step 1), then player i can leave Ek due to part (1) of lemma 6.
We remark here that, although cases 1∗ and 3∗ can be done in a stationary way,
case 2∗ may require a history-dependent strategy for player i. As pii is not necessarily
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stationary, the proof that such a pii defends wi in G against σ−i, i.e. γis(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ wis
for all s ∈ S, differs slightly from the proof in step 1, and therefore we provide a short
proof.
Consider (pii, σ−i) and take an arbitrary initial state s ∈ S. As we know, play
eventually settles, with probability 1, in a restricted game. Let ξ denote the random
variable for the index of this restricted game (so play settles in restricted game G¯ξ).
Due to the construction of pii, the corresponding set of states Eξ falls under case 2
∗,
and not under case 3∗. Hence, for player i’s reward we have
γis(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ Es,(pii,σ−i)(v¯
i
ξ) ≥ Es,(pii,σ−i)(w
i
ξ).
(Note that this inequality is the counter-part of inequality (16) from step 1.)
Notice further that, by the construction of pii, player i is assured that wi cannot
decrease in expectation during play with respect to (pii, σ−i) and initial state s, i.e. if
W im denotes the random variable for the minmax-level of player i in the state at stage
m, then given any possible outcome w′ ∈ R we have
Es,(pii,σ−i)(W
i
m+1|W
i
m = w
′) ≥ w′.
(Note that this inequality is the counter-part of inequality P (xi, x−i)wi ≤ wi from step
1.) Hence,
wis ≤ Es,(pii,σ−i)
(
wiξ
)
.
(This conclusion is very intuitive, and it immediately follows from basic optional stop-
ping theorems for submartingales, as we only have finitely many states and actions.
Note that this inequality is the counter-part of inequality wi ≥ Q(xi, x−i)wi from step
1.) In conclusion,
γis(pi
i, σ−i) ≥ Es,(pii,σ−i)(w
i
ξ) ≥ w
i
s,
proving step 2.
The previous lemma (and its proof) has important consequences. First, the results
from section 3.1.2 are now applicable to general aperiodic product-games, providing us
the necessary structural properties of the minmax-levels in the general context. This
is stated next.
Corollary 8 The results of lemmas 2 up to 5 in section 3.1.2 for simple aperiodic
product-games are also valid for any general aperiodic product-game G. Lemma 6
extends as well if one interprets zik as the minmax-level v¯
i
k of player i in the restricted
game G¯k (note that v¯
i
k is constant on Ek by lemma 1, and evidently coincides with z
i
k
of G˜, where G˜ is the simple product-game derived in lemma 7).
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Notice that, as a consequence of the proof of lemma 7, the joint stationary strategy
x−i in step 1 in the proof guarantees in the original game G that player i’s reward from
any initial state s ∈ S is at most vis = w
i
s. Hence, the infimum in expression (6) of
the minmax-levels is attained at stationary strategies, for all product-games. This will
become important later, as we are heading towards 0-equilibria, which do not allow
even small positive error terms.
Corollary 9 (of step 1 of the proof of lemma 7) Take an aperiodic product-game G
and an arbitrary player i. Then, players −i have a joint stationary strategy x−i which
guarantees that player i’s reward from any initial state s ∈ S is at most his minmax-
level vis, i.e. for all strategies pi
i for player i we have
γis(pi
i, x−i) ≤ vis.
With the help of this corollary, we are now ready to prove Main Theorem 2, which
claimed that, in every two-player aperiodic zero-sum product-game, both players have
a stationary 0-optimal strategy.
Proof of Main Theorem 2. Take an arbitrary two-player aperiodic zero-sum
product-game, and take player i = 1. By corollary 9, there exists a stationary strategy
x−1 for player 2 (as −1 = {2}) which guarantees that player 1’s reward is not more
than v1s for any initial state s ∈ S. Hence, x
−1 is 0-optimal for player 2. One finds
similarly a stationary 0-optimal strategy for player 1, which completes the proof.
3.2 The construction of 0-equilibria in product-games
In section 3.1 we achieved several results for the minmax-levels of aperiodic product-
games. We will use this knowledge now to construct 0-equilibria in aperiodic product-
games.
The following lemma deals with the restricted games. It states that, in any restricted
game, there exists a 0-equilibrium in which, if no player deviates, the players’ future
expectations remain unchanged during the whole play.
Lemma 10 Let G be an arbitrary aperiodic product-game and consider the restricted
game G¯k, for any k = (k
1, . . . , kn) ∈ K. Then, there exists a 0-equilibrium pi in G¯k
such that the corresponding rewards are independent of the initial state and all the
continuation rewards remain unchanged with probability 1 during the whole play. More
precisely, the reward γ¯is(pi[h]) is independent of the initial state s ∈ Ek and the history
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h, given h occurs with a positive probability with respect to pi. Here γ¯ denotes the average
reward for the restricted game G¯k.
Proof. Observe the following for the game G¯k.
(i) The set of feasible rewards (i.e. the rewards that can be obtained by some joint
strategy) is the same from any initial state in Ek. This is an immediate consequence of
the fact that, as Ek is an aperiodic joint maximal communicating set, the players can
move from any state in Ek to any other one in Ek, possibly in a number of steps.
(ii) The extreme points of the set of feasible rewards are induced by pure stationary
strategies (cf. for example the appendix in Dutta [1995]).
(iii) Each minmax-level in G¯k is a constant v¯
i
k, by lemma 1.
Given these three observations, this game situation is almost identical to a repeated
game. The following ideas and arguments are standard in Folk-theorems for repeated
games. For the context of stochastic games, we refer to Dutta [1995]. Take an arbitrary
feasible reward zk = (z
1
k, . . . , z
n
k ) such that z
i
k ≥ v¯
i
k for all players i. By property (ii),
we may write zk as a convex combination of rewards corresponding to pure stationary
strategies al, l = 1, . . . , L, i.e.
zk =
L∑
l=1
αl · γ¯(al).
Let σ be the pure joint strategy which prescribes to play as follows: play a1 for d
1
1
stages, then a2 for d
1
2 stages, ..., then aL for d
1
L stages, and repeat this with lengths
d21, . . . , d
2
L, then with lengths d
3
1, . . . , d
3
L, and so on. The lengths d
m
l have to be chosen
in such a way that, when m tends to infinity, then we have for each l ∈ {1, . . . , L} that
(a) dml goes to infinity, so that the expected average payoff when strategy al is played
for dml stages will approach γ¯(al); (b) d
m
l /(d
m
1 + . . . + d
m
L ) tends to αl, so that al is
played in the right proportion of time; (c)
dml
(d11 + . . . + d
m
L ) + . . . + (d
m−1
1 + . . . + d
m−1
L ) + d
m
1 + . . . + d
m
l−1
tends to 0, so that the average payoffs will fluctuate less and less. Due to these three
properties, σ induces reward zk, and moreover, any continuation reward is also zk, i.e.
γ¯s(σ[h]) = zk for all states s ∈ Ek and for all histories h. Let pi be the joint strategy
which prescribes to play σ, unless some player i deviates from the action prescribed
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by σi. In that case, from the new state, players −i should switch to a joint stationary
strategy x−i as in lemma 1. Since the players receive zk ≥ v¯k according to σ, while
if a player i deviates then his reward is not more than v¯ik, the joint strategy pi is a
0-equilibrium and satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Now we are sufficiently prepared to prove Main Theorem 1, which claimed that, in
any aperiodic product-game, there exists a 0-equilibrium.
Proof of Main Theorem 1. Take an arbitrary aperiodic product-game G. For
any player i, in view of corollary 9, we may take a joint stationary strategy y−i for
players −i such that for all initial states s ∈ S and for all strategies τ i for player i we
have
γis(τ
i, y−i) ≤ vis.
We will below define a joint strategy pi with important properties, amongst others
that the rewards are individually rational. The main idea for the construction of a
0-equilibrium is then to let the players play pi, unless some player i deviates from pii
and plays an action on which pii puts probability zero. If player i deviates in such a
way, then from the next state, say state s, players −i switch to the joint strategy y−i
and push down player i’s reward to a level of at most vis. In fact, y
−i acts as a threat
strategy, which forces player i to follow the prescriptions of pii. We wish to remark
that the use of such threat strategies for the construction of equilibria is standard in
stochastic games.
The proof of Main Theorem 1 consists of the following steps. In step 1, we con-
struct a joint stationary strategy x∗, which is used to reach the “right” joint maximal
communicating sets. Then, in step 2 we “extend” x∗ to the joint strategy pi accord-
ing to which the players also receive the “right” rewards in the “right” joint maximal
communicating sets. Finally, in step 3, we will complete the proof by showing that pi
supplemented with the joint stationary strategies y−i, for all i, as is described above,
forms a 0-equilibrium.
Step 1: The construction of the joint stationary strategy x∗ and a number of prop-
erties of x∗. As is mentioned above, x∗ will “guide” the players to the “right” joint
maximal communicating sets. In order to arrive at x∗, two supplementary games G˜
and G∗ have to be constructed. The game G˜ is a simple aperiodic product-game that
we derive from G, whereas G∗ is a stochastic game (not necessarily a product-game)
that we obtain by restricting the players in G˜ to certain mixed actions. Given G∗, the
joint strategy x∗ will be found as a stationary 0-equilibrium in the game G∗.
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Step 1.1: The simple aperiodic product-game G˜. Take a 0-equilibrium σk in every
restricted game G¯k as in lemma 10. Let z
i
k denote the corresponding reward for any
player i, which is independent of the initial state. Let G˜ denote the simple aperiodic
product-game which is derived from G by replacing each player i’s payoffs in any
restricted game G¯k by z
i
k. Further, let w
i
s denote player i’s minmax-level in G˜ from
initial state s. Recall that wis is a constant w
i
k on Ek, by lemma 4.
We will now argue that wis ≥ v
i
s for all players i and for all states s ∈ S. By lemma
7, vi equals player i’s minmax-level in the simple aperiodic product-game G′ which is
derived from G by replacing each player i’s payoffs in any restricted game G¯k by v¯
i
k.
Since zik is a 0-equilibrium reward in G¯k, we have z
i
k ≥ v¯
i
k. This means that player
i’s payoffs in G˜ are always larger or equal to his corresponding payoffs in G′, hence
wis ≥ v
i
s must hold indeed, for all players i and for all states s ∈ S.
Step 1.2: The stochastic game G∗. In this step, we will define a stochastic game G∗
which is derived from G˜ by restricting each player i in each state s ∈ S to a certain
(non-empty) subset X∗is ⊂ X
i
s of mixed actions. First, for every state s = (s
1, . . . , sn)
which belongs to some joint maximal communicating set Ek, fix an arbitrary completely
mixed action y¯is for every player i on X¯
i
s. Second, suppose that G¯k is a restricted game
such that zik < w
i
k for player i and that z
j
k ≥ w
j
k for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}. Then take
a state sik ∈ E
i
ki
and an “exit” action aik for player i in state s
i
k, with respect to the
game G˜ and its minmax-level wi, as in part (1) of lemma 6.
Now, given these fixed pure and mixed actions, we will now define the subset X∗is ⊂
Xis of mixed actions for every player i in every state s = (s
1, . . . , sn) ∈ S as follows.
First, if s is a state such that sj is of type 1 for at least one player j, then we let X∗is :=
Xis for all players i. Otherwise, for states belonging to a joint maximal communicating
set Ek, depending on the relation between zk and the players’ minmax-levels wk, we
distinguish the following mutually exclusive cases:
Case (a): zik ≥ w
i
k holds for all players i. Then, we let X
∗i
s := {y¯
i
s} for all players i.
Case (b): zik < w
i
k holds for player i and z
j
k ≥ w
j
k holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Then,
for players j 6= i, we let X∗js := {y¯
j
s}. As for player i, if si = sik then we let X
∗i
s := {a
i
k},
while if si 6= sik then we let X
∗i
s := {y¯
i
s}.
Notice that, due to the construction in cases (a) and (b), joint strategies x ∈ X∗
can only differ in states s such that sj is of type 1 for at least one player j. Moreover,
the ergodic sets for all x ∈ X∗ are precisely the joint maximal communicating sets Ek
belonging to case (a), due to the use of the “exit” actions which eventually make play
leave each Ek belonging to case (b).
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Let G∗ denote the stochastic game which is derived from G˜ by restricting each
player i in each state s ∈ S to the space X∗is of mixed actions. The game G
∗ is a well-
defined stochastic game (with the extreme points of X∗is , for every s ∈ S and for every
player i, acting as the set of pure actions for player i in state s), but not necessarily a
product-game.
Step 1.3: Defining x∗ as a stationary 0-equilibrium of G∗ and proving a number
of properties of x∗. As the ergodic sets are the same for all x ∈ X∗, lemma 12 in the
appendix yields a stationary 0-equilibrium x∗ ∈ X∗ for the game G∗. Obviously, x∗
is also a joint stationary strategy in the game G˜ and in the original game G, but not
necessarily a 0-equilibrium.
As a conclusion of step 1.3, we wish to point out three properties of x∗ in the game
G˜, and provide a proof.
Property (1): If s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is a state such that sj is of type 1 for at
least one player j, then no player i can go to better states regarding his reward by
unilaterally deviating from x∗is , i.e. for every action b
i
s ∈ A
i
s we have∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
∗−i
s )
(t) γ˜it(x
∗) ≤
∑
t∈S
psx∗s (t) γ˜
i
t(x
∗),
where γ˜i denotes the average reward to player i in the game G˜.
Property (2): If s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is a state such that si is of type 2 for all
players i, then no player i can improve on his expected minmax-level in the next state
by unilaterally deviating from x∗is , i.e. for every action b
i
s ∈ A
i
s we have∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
∗−i
s )
(t)wit ≤
∑
t∈S
psx∗s (t)w
i
t.
Consequently, equality (7) also yields
wis =
∑
t∈S
psx∗s (t)w
i
t. (17)
Property (3): x∗ yields individually rational rewards in G˜ for all initial states, i.e.
γ˜is(x
∗) ≥ wis for all players i and for all initial states s ∈ S.
Now, we provide the proofs for these properties.
Proof of property (1): This property follows from the fact that x∗ is a 0-equilibrium
in G∗, and no player is restricted in G∗ in state s.
Proof of property (2): This is due to parts (1) of lemmas 5 and 6.
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Proof of property (3): This property requires a longer argument. Notice that, as
x∗ ∈ X∗, all ergodic sets for x∗ are precisely the joint maximal communicating sets Ek
belonging to case (a), as is pointed out in step 1.2. Hence, if s ∈ S is recurrent for x∗,
then s belongs to some Ek considered under case (a), and we conclude for every player
i’s reward corresponding to x∗ from initial state s that
γ˜is(x
∗) = zik ≥ w
i
k = w
i
s, (18)
where γ˜i denotes the average reward to player i in the game G˜. This proves that x∗
yields individually rational rewards in G˜ for all initial states that are recurrent for x∗.
By applying equalities (7) for the game G˜, in every state s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S where
sj is of type 1 for at least one player j, there exists a mixed action xis ∈ X
i
s = X
∗i
s for
player i which defends wis against x
∗−i
s in the sense that∑
t∈S
p
s,(xis,x
∗−i
s )
(t)wit ≥ w
i
s. (19)
Given these mixed actions xis in such states s, there is a unique extension (with the
mixed actions prescribed by x∗ in all states belonging to joint maximal communicat-
ing sets) to a stationary strategy xi in X∗i. Consider the joint stationary strategy
(xi, x∗−i) ∈ X∗. Then, the recurrent states for (xi, x∗−i) and for x∗ coincide (as both
belong to X∗, cf. step 1.2) and if s ∈ S is recurrent for x∗ then (as xi equals x∗i on all
reccurent states) we have
γ˜is(x
i, x∗−i) = γ˜is(x
∗). (20)
Then, equalities (17) together with inequalities (19) yield P (xi, x∗−i)wi ≥ wi, which
implies Pm(xi, x∗−i)wi ≥ wi for all m ∈ N. Hence, Q(xi, x∗−i)wi ≥ wi. By applying
equality (5), we now obtain
γ˜i(xi, x∗−i) = Q(xi, x∗−i) · γ˜i(xi, x∗−i) ≥ Q(xi, x∗−i) · wi ≥ wi,
where the first inequality follows from inequality (18) and equality (20), and from the
fact that entry (t, s) of the stochastic matrix Q(xi, x∗−i) is only positive if state s is
recurrent for (xi, x∗−i), or equivalently, recurrent for x∗. Since x∗i is a best reply to
x∗−i in G∗ and since xi ∈ X∗i, we have
γ˜is(x
∗) ≥ γ˜is(x
i, x∗−i) ≥ wis
for all initial states s ∈ S, which proves property (3).
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Step 2 . The construction of the joint strategy pi for the original game G. Given x∗
from step 1, the definition of pi is easy. Let pi be the joint strategy which prescribes to
play as follows:
Case (1): states s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S in which sj of type 1 for at least one player j.
In this case, each player i follows x∗, i.e. plays the mixed action x∗is .
Case (2): when play reaches a joint maximal communicating set Ek for which
zik ≥ w
i
k holds for all players i (cf. case (a) in step 1.2). In this case, the players switch
to the joint strategy σk (cf. step 1.1).
Case (3): when play reaches a joint maximal communicating set Ek for which
zik < w
i
k holds for player i and z
j
k ≥ w
j
k holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} (cf. case (b) in
step 1.2). In this case, players −i switch to a joint stationary strategy as in lemma 1,
while player i follows x∗, i.e. plays the mixed action x∗is in state s ∈ Ek.
Notice that play leaves all sets Ek in case (3), due to the exit made by player i,
with the guidance of x∗. Moreover, notice also that in a set Ek in case (2), by switching
to σk, each player i receives in expectation reward z
i
k in the game G, which is exactly
what the players would receive within Ek according to x
∗ in the game G˜. So in some
sense, x∗ is used to reach the “right” joint maximal communicating sets, and then σk
takes over to induce the “right” payoffs in the original game G. Thus
γis(pi) = γ˜
i
s(x
∗)
for all initial states s ∈ S and for all players i, which by property (3) of step 1.3 yields
that pi induce rewards at least wi for each player i. In view of this, player i will have
an incentive to “exit” in any set Ek in case (2), since within G¯k he can get at most v¯
i
k,
while v¯ik ≤ z
i
k < w
i
k.
Step 3 . Proving that pi supplemented with the joint stationary strategies y−i, for
all players i, is a 0-equilibrium. Let η be the joint strategy which prescribes to play pi,
unless some player i deviates from pii and plays an action on which pii puts probability
zero. If player i deviates in such a way, then from the next state, players −i switch to
the joint strategy y−i and play it for the rest of play. As is already mentioned, the role
of y−i is to force every player i to follow the prescriptions of pii.
Note that the expected rewards with respect to η in the original game G equals the
expected rewards with respect to pi in the original game G, which is then also equal to
the rewards with respect to x∗ in the game G˜, i.e.
γis(η) = γ
i
s(pi) = γ˜
i
s(x
∗)
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for all initial states s ∈ S and for all players i. Notice also that if h denotes a history
and s ∈ S a state such that, with a positive probability, h can occur and s can be the
present state after h with respect to η (or equivalently with respect to pi), then
γis(η[h]) = γ
i
s(pi[h]) = γ
i
s(pi) = γ˜
i
s(x
∗), (21)
where for the second equality we used that for σk the “continuation rewards” remain
the same due to lemma 10. Hence, according to property (3) in step 1.3 above, we have
γis(η[h]) ≥ w
i
s (22)
for all players i and for such histories h and states s ∈ S. Since wis ≥ v
i
s, as is proven in
step 1.1, we conclude that η yields individually rational rewards in G, i.e. γis(η[h]) ≥ v
i
s
for all players i and for such histories h and states s ∈ S.
It remains to show that η is a 0-equilibrium in G. Notice first that no deviation
which only uses actions that had a positive probability according to η can improve the
expected reward of any player. Indeed, (i) within a set Ek belonging to case (2) in
step 2, the players play the 0-equilibrium σk in G¯k, (ii) within a set Ek belonging to
case (3) in step 2, such deviation by players −i (who do not make the “exit”) would
not change the probability of eventually moving to another set Ek′ , (iii) within a set
Ek belonging to case (3) in step 2, player i has an incentive to “exit” (as is already
pointed out in step 2), since within G¯k he can get at most v¯
i
k, and v¯
i
k ≤ z
i
k < w
i
k, (iv)
in states belonging to case (1) in step 2, no player i can go to better states regarding
his reward according to equalities (21) and to property (1) from step 1.3.
So, consider now a deviation when, for the first time, say after history h in state s,
when the players should play the joint mixed action x′s according to η, a player i deviates
and plays an action bis which has probability zero according to η
i, i.e. x′is (b
i
s) = 0. This
deviation is immediately noticed by players −i and, according to η, they switch to the
joint stationary strategy y−i from the next state, say state t. Consequently, player i’s
reward will be at most vit in expectation. Obviously, without deviation player i would
receive reward γis(η[h]) = γ˜
i
s(x
∗), in view of equalities (21). Now, observe the following.
(A) Suppose s is a state in which sj is of type 1 for at least one player j (possibly
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j = i). Then, x′s = x
∗
s, and player i’s expected reward after this deviation is at most∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
∗−i
s )
(t) vit ≤
∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
∗−i
s )
(t)wit
≤
∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
∗−i
s )
(t) γ˜it(x
∗)
≤
∑
t∈S
psx∗s (t) γ˜
i
t(x
∗)
= γ˜is(x
∗)
= γis(η[h]),
where the first inequalilty follows from vi ≤ wi as is pointed out in step 1.1; the second
and the third inequalities follow from properties (3) and (1) in step 1.3, respectively;
then the equalities follow from (4) and (21). Hence, the deviation is not profitable.
(B) Suppose s ∈ Ek for some joint maximal communicating set Ek. Then, player
i’s expected reward after this deviation is at most∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
′−i
s )
(t) vit ≤
∑
t∈S
p
s,(bis,x
′−i
s )
(t)wit ≤
∑
t∈S
psx′s(t)w
i
t ≤ γ
i
s(η[h]),
where the first inequalilty follows from vi ≤ wi as is pointed out in step 1.1, the second
inequality follows from parts (1) of lemmas 5 and 6 for the game G˜, while the last
inequality from inequalities (22). Hence, the deviation is not profitable again.
In conclusion, no deviation is profitable, and η is a 0-equilibrium in G. This com-
pletes the proof of Main Theorem 1. ¥
Remark 11 It remains unclear whether 0-equilibria always exist within the class of
stationary strategies. This question is already challenging in the situation when each
player i’s state space Si is just one maximal communicating set (precisely the situation
we have in a restricted game), meaning that S is one joint maximal communicating set.
Even though, corollary 8 would yield that all minmax-levels are constant on the whole
state space S, it is still not evident how one should get a grip on the problem.
4 Periodic product-games
The previous sections dealt with aperiodic product-games. When we allow for periodic
maximal communicating sets, the situation changes. Take for example a product-game
with two players in which the Markov transition structure for either player is as follows:
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the state space is {1, 2}, there is only one action in either state, and this action leads
to the other state with probability 1. So in the product-game, depending on the initial
state, play moves back and forth either between states (1, 1) and (2, 2) or between
states (1, 2) and (2, 1). This game is periodic, of course. Suppose the payoffs for either
player are 1 in states (1, 1) and (2, 2), while 0 in states (1, 2) and (2, 1). Then, a solitary
move for player 1 in state (1, 2) would lead to state (2, 2), improving player 1’s payoff.
Hence, the important lemma 2 is no longer valid for periodic product-games, and the
proof in the previous sections are not directly applicable. Notice also that this game
has two joint maximal communicating sets, i.e. {(1, 1), (2, 2)} and {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, but
neither of them can be written as a product of the form E1×E2. This entails additional
difficulties, and makes the analysis more technical. Nevertheless, we conjecture that
the main results of this paper extend to the periodic case as well.
5 Appendix
Lemma 12 In a stochastic game, if the ergodic sets are the same for all joint station-
ary strategies, then there exists a stationary 0-equilibrium.
Proof. For a joint stationary strategy x ∈ X, consider the β-discounted reward,
with β ∈ (0, 1), defined for player i and initial state s ∈ S as
γiβs(x) := (1− β)
∞∑
m=1
βm−1Esx
(
Rim
)
,
where Rim is the random variable for the payoff for player i at stage m, and where
Esx stands for expectation with respect to initial state s and joint strategy x. Fink
[1964] and Takahashi [1964] showed that, for every β ∈ (0, 1), there exists a stationary
0-equilibrium with respect to the β-discounted rewards.
As the ergodic sets are the same for all joint stationary strategies, it is known (cf.
lemma 2.7.6 in Flesch [1998]) that for any sequence of discount factors βm converging
to 1 and joint strategies xm converging to x we have
γis(x) = lim
m→∞
γiβms(xm) (23)
for all states s ∈ S and players i.
We will now work with a number of sequences in compact spaces. By taking sub-
sequences, we may assume that all these sequences have limits. Let βm be a sequence
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of discount factors converging to 1, and for any m ∈ N, let xm be a stationary βm-
discounted 0-equilibrium. Let x = limm→∞ xm. We will show that x is a 0-equilibrium
with respect to the average reward.
Take an arbitrary player i and a stationary best reply yi to x−i. Then for any initial
state s ∈ S, from (23) and from the fact that xm is a βm-discounted 0-equilibrium, it
follows that
γis(y
i, x−i) = lim
m→∞
γiβms(y
i, x−im ) ≤ lim
m→∞
γiβms(xm) = γ
i(x).
As yi is a best reply to x−i, the joint strategy x is a stationary 0-equilibrium with
respect to the average reward indeed.
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